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I. INTRODUCTION 
This article adds to the growing library of analysis and commentary 
on Minnesota family law. 1  It surveys, reviews, analyzes, and comments 
 
 1. See generally Bradley J. Betlach, The Unconstitutionality of the Minnesota 
Defense of Marriage Act: Ignoring Judgments, Restricting Travel and Purposeful 
Discrimination, 24 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 407 (1998); Kathleen A. Blatz, A Minnesota 
Comparative Family Law Symposium, 28 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 493 (2001); Kathleen 
Blatz, Children and the Law: Keeping an Eye on the Child, 26 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 
625 (2000); Rochelle Bobroff, Judicial Deference to Federal Government Erodes 
Medicaid Protections for Elderly Spouses Impoverished by the High Costs of Nursing 
Home Care, 29 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 159 (2002); William Forsberg, Partners in Life 
and at Death: The New Minnesota Elective Share of a Surviving Spouse Statute, 23 WM. 
MITCHELL L. REV. 377 (1997); Robert M. Gordon, Drifting Through Byzantium: The 
Promise and Failure of the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, 83 MINN. L. REV. 
637 (1999); Brian J. Guidera, Concurrent Permanency Planning: Implementation in 
Hennepin County, 26 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 699 (2000); Susan Harris, Open Hearings: 
A Questionable Solution, 26 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 673 (2000); Brent R. Lindahl, 
Insurance Coverage for an Innocent Co-Insured Spouse, 23 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 433 
(1997); David D. Meyer, Self-Definition in the Constitution of Faith and Family, 86 
MINN. L. REV. 791 (2002); Allison Morse, Comment, Social Science in the Courtroom: 
Expert Testimony and Battered Women, 21 HAMLINE L. REV. 287 (1998); Tiernee L. 
Nelsen, Recent Development, Family Law, 26 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1311 (2000); 
Robert E. Oliphant, Redefining a Statute Out of Existence: Minnesota’s View of When a 
Custody Modification Hearing Can Be Held, 26 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 711 (2000); 
Theresa A. Peterson, Note, The State of Child Custody in Minnesota: Why Minnesota 
Should Enact the Parenting Plan Legislation, 25 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1577 (1999); 
Jane Ranum, Minnesota’s Permanency and Concurrent Planning Child Welfare System, 
26 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 687 (2000); Heidi S. Schellhas, Open Child Protection 
Proceedings in Minnesota, 26 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 631 (2000); Lawrence Schlam, 
Third Party Custody Disputes in Minnesota: Overcoming the “Natural Rights” of 
Parents or Pursuing the “Best Interests” of Children?, 26 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 733 
(2000); Nancy Ver Steegh, The Silent Victims: Children and Domestic Violence, 26 WM. 
MITCHELL L. REV. 775 (2000); Victor I. Vieth, In My Neighbor’s House: A Proposal to 
Address Child Abuse in Rural America, 22 HAMLINE L. REV. 143 (1998); Victor I. Vieth, 
Passover in Minnesota: Mandated Reporting and the Unequal Protection of Abused 
Children, 24 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 131 (1998); Peter K. Wahl, Little Power to Help 
Brenda?  A Defense of the Indian Child Welfare Act and its Continued Implementation in 
Minnesota, 26 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 811 (2000); Elizabeth Warren, Bankrupt Children, 
86 MINN. L. REV. 1003 (2002); Tsippi Wray, Lesbian Relationships and Parenthood: 
Models for Legal Recognition of Nontraditional Families, 21 HAMLINE L. REV. 127 
2
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on the decisions of Minnesota’s appellate courts in the sometimes 
challenging and always interesting areas of subject matter and personal 
jurisdiction.2 
The article examines many of the more common issues associated 
with jurisdiction that impact Minnesota family law in the areas of child 
support, custody, property division, maintenance, and paternity.  It 
investigates the jurisdictional questions involved when applying 
Minnesota’s long-arm statute3 and weighs the potential constitutional 
barriers to its application.4  It also examines relevant provisions of the 
Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA)5, the Uniform Child 
Custody Jurisdiction Enforcement Act (UCCJEA),6 the Indian Child 
Welfare Act (ICWA),7 the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act 
(UIFSA),8 and the Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Relief Act.9  There is a brief 
review of subject matter issues associated with bringing family lawsuits 
in federal court.10  Decisions from other jurisdictions are used and 
discussed where appropriate.  Throughout the article one will find 
suggestions for improving the language of some of Minnesota’s statutes 
that impact jurisdiction, as well as additional suggestions for 
reconsidering some of the statutory language applied by Minnesota’s 
courts to jurisdiction disputes. 
II. SUBJECT MATTER—GENERALLY  
It is axiomatic that a court must possess subject matter jurisdiction 
to hear any portion of a family law dispute; otherwise, it is powerless to 
proceed.  It also goes without saying that a court must possess personal 
 
(1997). 
 2. See, e.g., Len Biernat, A Minnesota Comparative Family Law Symposium, 
Forces Changing Family Law in Minnesota, 28 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 873 (2001); Misti 
N. Nelc, Inequitable Distribution: The Effect of Minnesota’s Child Support Guidelines on 
Prior And Subsequent Children, 17 LAW & INEQ. 97 (Winter, 1999); Robert E. Oliphant, 
Redefining a Statute Out of Existence: Minnesota’s View of When a Custody Modification 
Hearing Can Be Held, 26 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 711 (2000); Robert E. Oliphant, Is 
Sweeping Change Possible?  Minnesota Adopts the Uniform Interstate Family Law Act, 
21 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 989 (1996). 
 3. See infra Part XVII. 
 4. See infra Part XVIII. 
 5. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (2000); see infra Part XXII. 
 6. See MINN. STAT. §§ 518D.101-317 (2002); see infra Part XX. 
 7. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963 (2000); see infra Part XXI. 
 8. See MINN. STAT. §§ 518C.101-902 (2002); see infra Part XIX. 
 9. 50 U.S.C §§ 501-591 (2000); see infra Part XXIII. 
 10. See infra Part XXIV. 
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jurisdiction over both parties if it is to make a binding order imposing 
personal obligations on them such as maintenance, child support, or 
attorneys’ fees.  Where both parties cannot be found, a court may still 
dissolve a marriage so long as it has jurisdiction over one of them and 
appropriate efforts are made to provide notice of the action to the other 
spouse.11 
The general principles associated with the exercise of subject matter 
jurisdiction are well known.  Subject-matter jurisdiction is described as 
the court’s power to hear and determine the general subject involved in 
the action.12  Subject matter jurisdiction may not be waived by failing to 
raise it before, during, or after trial.13  Furthermore, subject matter 
jurisdiction may be questioned at any time, even by the court sua sponte 
for the first time on appeal because “subject matter jurisdiction cannot be 
conferred upon the court by consent of the parties.”14 
In the context of a family law dispute, Minnesota courts have 
consistently stated that a judgment entered by a court without subject 
matter jurisdiction is void.15  More precisely, they have declared that a 
divorce granted absent satisfaction of certain residency requirements is 
void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.16 However, should a modern 
court revisit this issue, it may well conclude that the residency provisions 
are nothing more, in fact, than elements of a cause of action.  The 
reasons for this conclusion follow in the next section. 
III. VOIDING A DIVORCE DECREE WHEN THE PARTIES 
FAIL TO COMPLY WITH RESIDENCE REQUIREMENTS  
Minnesota courts have not recently reassessed the implications of 
voiding a divorce decree months or years after it was entered because the 
statutory residency requirements were not met.  They have continued to 
rely upon a more-than-century-old decision, Thelan v. Thelan,17 to 
 
 11. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 734-35 (1877). 
 12. See Duennow v. Lindeman, 223 Minn. 505, 511, 27 N.W.2d 421, 425 (1947) 
(defining subject matter jurisdiction as the “authority to hear and determine the particular 
questions the court assumes to decide”) (quoting Sache v. Wallace, 101 Minn. 169, 172, 
112 N.W. 386, 387 (1907)). 
 13. Marzitelli v. City of Little Canada, 582 N.W.2d 904, 907 (Minn. 1998). 
 14. Herubin v. Finn, 603 N.W.2d 133, 137 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999) (citing 
Hemmesch v. Molitor, 328 N.W.2d 445, 447 (Minn. 1983)). 
 15. See, e.g., Thelan v. Thelan, 75 Minn. 433, 436, 78 N.W. 108, 109 (1899). 
 16. Wyman v. Wyman, 297 Minn. 465, 467, 212 N.W.2d 368, 369 (1973) (“A 
divorce granted without complying with the statute is void for lack of jurisdiction”); see 
also Thelan, 75 Minn. at 436, 78 N.W. at 109. 
 17. Thelan, 75 Minn. at 433, 78 N.W. at 108. 
4
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support the proposition that failure to meet residency requirements is the 
equivalent of an absence of subject matter jurisdiction.18  However, a 
reasonable argument can be made that the residence provisions contained 
in the Minnesota Statutes19 have been historically misunderstood. 
Support for this view is found in the Minnesota Constitution and in 
the Minnesota legislature’s grant of subject matter jurisdiction.20  The 
language in these provisions is significantly different from that found in 
Minnesota Statutes section 518.07, which Minnesota courts have used to 
support the voidness theory. 
The Minnesota Constitution contains the following language that 
provides district courts with subject matter jurisdiction: “The district 
court has original jurisdiction in all civil and criminal cases and shall 
have appellate jurisdiction as prescribed by law.”21  The legislature, in 
response to this constitutional provision, enacted the following: 
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction in all civil 
actions within their respective districts, in all cases of crime 
committed or triable therein, in all special proceedings not 
exclusively cognizable by some other court or tribunal, and in 
all other cases wherein such jurisdiction is especially conferred 
upon them by law. They shall also have appellate jurisdiction 
in every case in which an appeal thereto is allowed by law 
from any other court, officer, or body.22 
Minnesota Statutes section 518.07, upon which the view of subject 
matter in a dissolution action rests, reads as follows: 
No dissolution shall be granted unless (1) one of the parties has 
resided in this state, or has been a member of the armed 
services stationed in this state, for not less than 180 days 
immediately preceding the commencement of the proceeding; 
or (2) one of the parties has been a domiciliary of this state for 
not less than 180 days immediately preceding commencement 
of the proceeding.23 
Although one can argue that the phrase in chapter 484 declaring that 
courts have jurisdiction when it is “especially conferred on them by law” 
makes section 518.07 a subject matter statute, one can also argue that had 
 
 18. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Ladd, No. C0-99-710, 1999 WL 994023 (Minn. Ct. 
App. Nov. 2, 1999) (citing Thelan, 75 Minn. at 436, 78 N.W. at 109). 
 19. See MINN. STAT. § 518.07 (2002). 
 20. See MINN. STAT. § 484, subd. 1 (2002). 
 21. MINN. CONST. art. VI, § 3. 
 22. MINN. STAT. § 484, subd. 1 (2002). 
 23. MINN. STAT. § 518.07 (2002). 
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the legislature intended that Minnesota Statutes section 518.07 be 
jurisdictional, it would have included specific language to that effect in 
the statute.  While the underlying purpose of Minnesota Statutes section 
518.07 is to establish residency requirements for commencing a 
dissolution, there is no language suggesting that a failure to meet the 
requirements divests a court of subject matter jurisdiction or that a 
judgment entered without meeting the requirements is void.24 
The New York Court of Appeals considered a similar question in 
Lacks v. Lacks.25  In the case, the plaintiff had obtained a divorce in New 
York on the ground of cruelty.26  Under New York law, one of the 
parties to the divorce action must have resided in the state for one year.27  
Two years after the decree was entered, and after the time to appeal had 
passed, the original defendant moved to vacate the judgment on the 
ground that the court was without subject matter jurisdiction to entertain 
the action.28  She alleged that the plaintiff had not been a resident in New 
York State for a full year preceding the commencement of the divorce 
action as required by New York law and that the judgment was void.29  
In rejecting the claim, the court made a penetrating analysis of the 
difference between a substantive element of a cause of action and subject 
matter jurisdiction. 
[T]he principal issue [is] whether an otherwise valid divorce 
judgment depends, jurisdictionally, upon a correct 
determination of the statutory residence requirements, that is, 
 
 24. See id. 
 25. 359 N.E.2d 384 (N.Y. 1976), re-argument denied, 362 N.E.2d 261 (N.Y. 1976). 
 26. Id. at 385-86. 
 27. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 230 (McKinney 1999).  The entire New York statute, 
regarding the required residence of parties reads: 
An action to annul a marriage, or to declare the nullity of a void marriage, or 
for divorce or separation may be maintained only when: 1. The parties were 
married in the state and either party is a resident thereof when the action is 
commenced and has been a resident for a continuous period of one year 
immediately preceding, or 2. The parties have resided in this state as husband 
and wife and either party is a resident thereof when the action is commenced 
and has been a resident for a continuous period of one year immediately 
preceding, or 3. The cause occurred in the state and either party has been a 
resident thereof for a continuous period of at least one year immediately 
preceding the commencement of the action, or 4. The cause occurred in the 
state and both parties are residents thereof at the time of the commencement 
of the action, or 5. Either party has been a resident of the state for a 
continuous period of at least two years immediately preceding the 
commencement of the action. 
 28. Lacks, 359 N.W.2d at 386. 
 29. Id. 
6
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whether the competence of the court depends upon a correct 
determination of the residence requirements. 
The confusion, if there be confusion, starts with a line of 
decisions dating back to the last century and continuing into 
the present in which this court has said with less than perfect 
meticulousness that “jurisdiction” of New York courts in 
matrimonial cases is limited to the powers conferred by statute 
. . . . Jurisdiction is a word of elastic, diverse, and disparate 
meanings. 
A statement that a court lacks “jurisdiction” to decide a case 
may, in reality, mean that elements of a cause of action are 
absent . . . . 
In Thrasher v. United States Liab. Ins. Co., this court, in 
discussing subject matter jurisdiction, drew a clear distinction 
between a court’s competence to entertain an action and its 
power to render a judgment on the merits.  Absence of 
competence to entertain an action deprives the court of 
“subject matter jurisdiction”; absence of power to reach the 
merits does not. 
The implications of this distinction are serious.  It is blackletter 
law that a judgment rendered without subject matter 
jurisdiction is void, and that the defect may be raised at any 
time and may not be waived . . . .  Thus stated, the rule is 
grossly oversimple.  The problem requires better analysis, and 
one long overdue . . . .  Nevertheless, the breadth with which 
the rule is often stated indicates the importance traditionally 
attached to so-called subject matter jurisdiction, really 
competence of courts, and the grave consequences, including 
denial of Res judicata effect to judgments, which may result 
from a lack of true subject matter jurisdiction or competence. 
Beyond the confusion engendered by a misapplication of the 
terminology and concept of subject matter jurisdiction, there is 
more created by the locution that in this State the courts’ power 
in matrimonial actions is exclusively statutory.  Yet in 
counterpoint, it has often been said: “the Supreme Court is a 
court of original, unlimited and unqualified jurisdiction” and 
“competent to entertain all causes of action unless its 
jurisdiction has been specifically proscribed.” 
. . . . 
In sum, the overly stated principle that lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction makes a final judgment absolutely void is not 
applicable to cases which, upon analysis, do not involve 
7
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jurisdiction, but merely substantive elements of a cause for 
relief.  To do so would be to undermine significantly the 
doctrine of Res judicata, and to eliminate the certainty and 
finality in the law and in litigation which the doctrine is 
designed to protect.30 
The Lacks court concluded that proof of the requisite period of 
residence was necessary to establish a cause of action for divorce but that 
failure to make the proof did not strip the court of subject matter 
jurisdiction. 
Other jurisdictions considering somewhat similar issues appear to 
agree with the New York court’s analysis.31  For example, in Daly v. 
Daly32 the Connecticut Court of Appeals rejected a subject matter 
challenge to a nineteen-year-old judgment, saying: 
[W]e have also recognized that “[t]he modern law of civil 
procedure suggests that even litigation about subject matter 
jurisdiction should take into account the importance of the 
principle of the finality of judgments, particularly when the 
parties have had a full opportunity originally to contest the 
jurisdiction of the adjudicatory tribunal.”33 
 
 30. Lacks, 359 N.E.2d at 386-88 (citations omitted). 
 31. See Minto v. Lambert, 870 P.2d 572, 575-76 (Colo. Ct. App. 1993) (stating a 
requirement of good faith negotiations before the commencement of condemnation 
proceedings is not restriction on district court’s subject matter jurisdiction, but merely 
element of claim for relief); Vogel v. Vogel, 422 A.2d 271, 273 (Conn. 1979) (rejecting 
attack on twenty-year-old dissolution judgment); People v. Jackson, 198 Cal. Rptr. 135, 
139 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. 1983) (stating a statutory requirement governing 
municipal and justice court jurisdiction; that the offense charged must be committed 
within the county of such court was in the nature of non-fundamental, waivable 
“territorial jurisdiction”).  The court in B.J.P. v. R.W.P. stated: 
A consideration of the “environment” in which the jurisdictional 
issue arises in this case persuades us that the mother’s objections to 
the trial court’s authority may be (and here have been) waived, and 
that it would be inequitable to permit her to raise them for the first 
time on appeal. 
The purported lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on territorial 
considerations—a fair characterization of the asserted defect here—
has been held to be analytically similar to improper venue; it does not 
go to the power of the court to adjudicate the case, and may be 
waived if not asserted in timely fashion. 
637 A.2d 74, 78-79 (D.C. 1994). 
 32. 561 A.2d 951 (Conn. App. Ct. 1989). 
 33. Id. at 953 (citations omitted) (citing Meinket v. Levinson, 474 A.2d 454, 455-56 
(Conn. 1984) (quoting Monroe v. Monroe, 413 A.2d 819 (Conn. 1979); Conn. Pharm. 
Ass’n, v. Milano, 468 A.2d 1230 (Conn. 1983); Vogel v. Vogel, 422 A.2d 271 (Conn. 
1979); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 12 (1982); FLEMING JAMES, JR. & 
GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 13.16 (2d ed. 1977)); Morris v. Irwin, 494 
8
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In Will of Brown,34 the court briefly discussed the due process 
implications of the Lacks decision. Observed the court: 
[A] defendant who had appeared in a New York divorce action 
could not, after final judgment, collaterally attack the subject 
matter jurisdiction of the court to make the decree as void in 
New York or elsewhere on the basis that the plaintiff’s New 
York residence had subsisted less than the one year or two year 
period called for by the statute . . . so long as the plaintiff had 
the minimal contacts with New York said to make the decree 
enforceable under the full faith and credit clause.35 
In conclusion, a reasonable argument can be made that the 
residency requirement contained in Minnesota Statutes section 518.07 is 
necessary to establish a cause of action for a divorce; however, the 
failure to make the proof does not strip the court of subject matter 
jurisdiction given to it by the Minnesota Constitution and Minnesota 
Statutes chapter 484.  It is suggested that the present construction given 
by Minnesota’s courts should be reexamined.  Alternatively, the 
provision should be rewritten to prevent a dissolution judgment of many 
years from being reopened solely on a theory that the courts lacked 
subject matter jurisdiction. 
IV. ELEMENTS OF A DISSOLUTION 
Minnesota is a “no-fault” jurisdiction.  Consequently, a marriage 
dissolution may be granted without requiring that one party be at fault.  
To “prove up” a dissolution petition, a party need only show that there 
“has been an irretrievable breakdown of the marriage relationship.”36  
While the elements to establish a basis for divorce vary among the 
states,37 Minnesota’s legislature allows a dissolution solely on this 
 
A.2d 626 (Conn. App. Ct. 1985)). 
 34. 505 N.Y.S.2d 334, 341 (Sur. Ct., Kings County 1986). 
 35 Id.  
 36. MINN. STAT. § 518.06, subd. 1 (2002). 
 37. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 30-2-1(a)(1)-(12) (1993) (including grounds of 
irretrievable breakdown, abandonment for one year, imprisonment for two years under 
sentence of seven or more years, habitual drunkenness or drug addiction, insanity, non-
support for two years); ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.050(1)-(9) (Michie 1991) (listing, among 
other grounds, incompatibility of temperament, adultery, and willful desertion for one 
year); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-12-301(1)-(8) (Michie 1991) (including no fault, impotence, 
cruel and barbarous treatment, and willful nonsupport); CAL. FAM. CODE § 2310 (West 
1994) (requiring irremediable breakdown or incurable insanity); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 46b-40, -51 (West 1986) (listing irretrievable breakdown, living apart for eighteen 
months due to incompatibility); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.052 (West 1985 & Supp. 1992) 
9
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(including irretrievable breakdown and mental incompetence for up to three years); GA. 
CODE ANN. § 19-5-3(1)-(13) (Harrison 1991) (listing irretrievable breakdown, adultery, 
desertion for one year, mental incapacity at the time of the marriage, cruel treatment, and 
incurable mental illness); IDAHO CODE §§ 32-603, -610 (Michie 1983) (including 
irreconcilable differences and five years of separation); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/401 
(1999) (listing irretrievable breakdown, impotence, and adultery); IND. CODE. ANN. § 31-
15-1-2 (West 1997) (including irretrievable breakdown, conviction of a felony, incurable 
insanity lasting for at least two years, impotency existing at the time of the marriage); 
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1601(a) (1983) (including incompatibility and failure to perform a 
material duty or obligation); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 103 (West Supp. 1992) (including 
irretrievable breakdown and adultery); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 902(1) (West 
1997) (requiring irreconcilable differences); MD. CODE ANN., FAM LAW  § 7-103 (1991) 
(listing one-year voluntary separation or two years living separate and apart, insanity, 
adultery, or abandonment); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 208, §§ 1, 1A (West 1992) 
(including irretrievable breakdown and adultery, desertion for one year, or cruel and 
abusive treatment); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 93-5-1 to -2 (1972 & Supp. 1990) (requiring 
irreconcilable differences); MO. REV. STAT. § 452.320 (1986) (requiring irretrievable 
breakdown for uncontested divorces; if contested, petitioner must show either period of 
separation or fault); NEV. REV. STAT. 125.010 (1991) (including living separately for one 
year, incompatibility, and insanity for two years); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 458:7, :7-a 
(1992) (listing irreconcilable differences, extreme cruelty, absence for two years, or 
joining a religious sect or society that believes the relation of husband and wife is 
unlawful, and refusing to cohabit for six months); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:34-2 (West 
1987) (including eighteen months of separation in different habitation and no reasonable 
prospect of reconciliation, as well as traditional fault such as adultery, willful desertion 
for twelve or more months, and extreme mental or physical cruelty); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 
40-4-1 (Michie 1993) (requiring incompatibility, abandonment, or adultery); N.Y. DOM. 
REL. LAW § 170 (McKinney 1988) (including living apart for one year pursuant to a 
separation agreement, cruel and inhuman physical or mental treatment); N.C. GEN. STAT. 
§§ 50-5.1, -6 (1987) (requiring living separate and apart for one year, or three years’ 
separation because of incurable insanity); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-05-03, -09.1 (1991) 
(listing irreconcilable differences, willful neglect, habitual intemperance, and conviction 
of a felony); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3105.01 (Anderson 1993 & Supp. 1991) (including 
living separately for one year, bigamy, extreme cruelty, and any gross neglect of duty); 
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, 3 § 101 (West 1990) (listing incompatibility, abandonment for 
one year, habitual drunkenness, and gross neglect of duty); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 
3301 (West 1991) (requiring irretrievable breakdown); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 15-5-2, -3 
(1988) (listing irreconcilable differences, extreme cruelty, adultery, or any other gross 
misbehavior and wickedness that is “repugnant to and in violation of the marriage 
covenant”); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-3-10 (Law. Co-op. 1993) (including living apart for 
one year, physical cruelty, and habitual drunkenness); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 25-4-1 to -
18 (Michie 1992) (listing irreconcilable differences, adultery, extreme cruelty); TENN. 
CODE ANN. §§ 36-4-101, -102 (1991) (including irreconcilable differences, impotence, 
bigamy, adultery); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 6.001-.007 (Vernon 1998) (including 
marriage that is insupportable because of discord or conflict of personalities that destroys 
legitimate ends of the marriage relationship and prevents any reasonable expectation of 
reconciliation, living apart for three years, cruelty, and confinement in mental hospital for 
three years); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-1(3) (1993) (including irreconcilable differences 
and living apart for three consecutive years under a decree of separate maintenance 
without cohabitation, physical or mental cruelty); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 551 (1993) 
(requiring resumption of marital relationship is not reasonably probable, willful desertion 
10
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ground.38  An “irretrievable breakdown” has been construed to mean that 
there is “no reasonable prospect of reconciliation.”39  This provision 
appears to accurately reflect current public policy, which is not to return 
to a fault based system. 
 
or absence); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-91 (Michie 1990 & Supp. 1992) (including living apart 
as well as adultery, causing apprehension of bodily hurt); W. VA. CODE § 48-5-201 
(2001) (listing irreconcilable differences, adultery, felony conviction, and habitual 
drunkenness).  Cf. UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 302(a)(2) (amended 1973), 9A 
U.L.A. 200 (1998) (requiring irretrievable breakdown).  Several jurisdictions consider 
only no-fault grounds.  See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-312 (West 1991) (requiring 
irretrievable breakdown); COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-110 (1987) (requiring irretrievable 
breakdown); DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 13, § 1505 (1981) (defining irretrievable breakdown to 
include some acts of misconduct); D.C. Code Ann. § 16-904 (1993) (requiring proof of 
period of separation without reference to fault); HAW. REV. STAT. § 580-41 (1985) 
(defining “no fault” as either irretrievable breakdown or living apart for specified period); 
IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.5(7) (West 1981 & Supp. 1991) (requiring irretrievable 
breakdown); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.170 (Michie 1984) (requiring irretrievable 
breakdown); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 552.6 (West 1988) (requiring breakdown of 
relationship); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.06 (West 1990) (requiring irretrievable 
breakdown); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-104(b) (1991) (requiring irretrievable breakdown 
with evidence of separation or serious discord); NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-361 (1988) 
(requiring irretrievable breakdown); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 107.025, .036 (1971) (requiring 
irreconcilable differences; doctrine of fault abolished); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.030 
(1992) (requiring irretrievable breakdown); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 767.12(2) (West 1981 & 
Supp. 1992) (requiring irretrievable breakdown); WYO. STAT. §§ 20-2-104, -105 (Michie 
1987) (recognizing irreconcilable differences as well as traditional grounds such as 
insanity). 
 38. The language of Minnesota’s dissolution statute reads as follows: 
518.06. Dissolution of marriage; legal separation; grounds; uncontested legal 
separation 
Subdivision 1.  A dissolution of marriage is the termination of the marital 
relationship between a husband and wife.  A decree of dissolution 
completely terminates the marital status of both parties.  A legal separation is 
a court determination of the rights and responsibilities of a husband and wife 
arising out of the marital relationship.  A decree of legal separation does not 
terminate the marital status of the parties.  A dissolution of a marriage shall 
be granted by a county or district court when the court finds that there has 
been an irretrievable breakdown of the marriage relationship. 
A decree of legal separation shall be granted when the court finds that one or 
both parties need a legal separation. 
Defenses to divorce, dissolution and legal separation, including but not 
limited to condonation, connivance, collusion, recrimination, insanity, and 
lapse of time, are abolished. 
Subd. 2. Repealed by Laws 1978, c. 772, § 63. 
Subd. 3. If one or both parties petition for a decree of legal separation and 
neither party contests the granting of the decree nor petitions for a decree of 
dissolution, the court shall grant a decree of legal separation. 
MINN. STAT. § 518.06 (2002). 
 39. MINN. STAT. § 518.13, subd. 2 (2002). 
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V. LEGAL SEPARATION 
A party seeking a legal separation is not bound by the same 
requirements as one seeking a marriage dissolution.40  For example, 
actions for legal separation are exempt from the 180-day residence 
requirement.41  Consequently, where a divorce claim cannot be proven 
because of the 180-day residence barrier, a petition for a legal separation 
can be filed and heard.  In this proceeding a court may award child 
support, maintenance, custody and attorneys’ fees and the separation 
may later be converted to a divorce action.  A court must, of course, 
possess personal jurisdiction over both parties during the legal separation 
proceeding to make an award of support or divide the couple’s personal 
and real property. 
VI. DOMICILE AND RESIDENCE 
It was suggested earlier in this article that neither residence nor 
domicile are jurisdictional prerequisites to Minnesota exercising subject 
matter jurisdiction in a dissolution matter—they are merely elements of a 
cause of action.42  Therefore, if the residency elements are successfully 
challenged during a divorce proceeding, the action must be dismissed.  
However, the failure to raise them should not automatically void the 
judgment.  This section of the article contains a brief analysis of the 
distinction Minnesota’s courts and legislature have made between 
“residence” and “domicile.” 
Minnesota’s courts appear to have consistently applied well-
accepted principles of law when considering questions of domicile and 
residence.  For example, they have stated that “[d]omicile is the union of 
residence and intention . . . .”43  They have also stated that a legal 
resident who temporarily lives in another state may still meet the 
statutory requirements for domicile or residency if the Minnesota place 
of domicile has not changed;44 “[i]f the change in physical presence is 
made without intent to abandon the old home, domicile has not 
changed.”45 
 
 40. See Donigan v. Donigan, 236 Minn. 516, 521, 53 N.W.2d 635, 638 (1952). 
 41. MINN. STAT. § 518.10(d)(1) (1990). 
 42. See supra Part II. 
 43. Davidner v. Davidner, 304 Minn. 491, 493, 232 N.W.2d 5, 7 (1975). 
 44. Bechtel v. Bechtel, 101 Minn. 511, 515, 112 N.W. 883, 884 (1907) (holding 
that wife, who was forced by husband to leave state, never intended to take up permanent 
abode in other state and was considered legal resident). 
 45. Davidner, 304 Minn. at 494, 232 N.W.2d at 7 (holding husband’s move from 
12
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The legislature has stated that the term “residence” is susceptible to 
different interpretations depending upon the “context” in which it is 
used.46  Given this definition, residence has sometimes functioned as the 
equivalent of domicile while at other times it has meant only bodily 
presence or temporary abode. The primary difference between these 
terms concerns the intent of the individual.  Generally, “residence” has 
required only bodily presence whereas “domicile” has required presence 
plus an intention to make a place one’s permanent home. 
In Jones v. Jones,47 the court suggested that the purpose of a 
residency requirement is to prevent nonresidents from coming into 
Minnesota with their marital grievances;48 apparently it acts to prevent 
the state from becoming a divorce mill. 
Although Minnesota’s courts have encountered little difficulty 
making a distinction between domicile and residence, it may be helpful if 
the legislature were to incorporate the legal principles into two 
definitions: one for residence and the other for domicile. 
VII. DIVISIBLE DIVORCE  
In Pennoyer v. Neff 49 the United States Supreme Court stated that 
personal jurisdiction over a nonresident spouse is not necessary to 
dissolve a marriage.  This principle rests on the theory that every state 
possesses jurisdiction to determine the civil status and capacities of all its 
inhabitants and has the authority to prescribe the conditions on which 
proceedings affecting them may be commenced and carried on within its 
boundaries.  Consequently, a state is viewed as having an absolute right 
to prescribe the conditions upon which the marriage relation between its 
own citizens shall be created, and the causes for which it may be 
dissolved.  When a state possesses in rem jurisdiction over the res or 
“thing,” which is the marriage itself, and has in personam jurisdiction 
over the plaintiff or petitioner, a valid ex parte divorce may be granted on 
whatever basis a state sees fit. The decree is recognized as having 
absolute and binding finality within the confines of its borders. 
 
Minnesota to Utah for medical residency was only for definite period, and he formed no 
intent to remain permanently in Utah). 
 46. MINN. STAT. § 518.003, subd. 1 (1990) (“For the purposes of this chapter, the 
following terms have the meanings provided in this section unless the context clearly 
requires otherwise”). 
 47. 402 N.W.2d 146 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987). 
 48. Id. at 148. 
 49. 95 U.S. 714 (1877). 
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The power to change the status of a state citizen has led to the 
development of the “divisible divorce” doctrine, which recognizes that 
issues other than the dissolution of the marriage are severed from the 
divorce action when the court does not have personal jurisdiction over 
the other spouse.50  Estin v. Estin51 is illustrative of the application of the 
“divisible divorce” doctrine.  The Court held that the Full Faith and 
Credit Clause did not require New York to enforce a Nevada divorce 
decree that failed to provide maintenance for a New York wife who had 
obtained support under a prior New York decree.52  The Court stated that 
while Nevada law permitted the marriage to be dissolved because of the 
petitioner’s connection with the forum, property rights and personal 
obligations could not be adjudicated unless the forum court had personal 
jurisdiction over the respondent spouse.53 
Under the “divisible divorce doctrine,” issues other than the 
dissolution of the marriage are severed from the divorce and the 
judgment does not resolve issues other than the marital status of the 
parties.54  This doctrine is recognized by the Restatement of Conflict of 
Laws55 and has been accepted and applied by Minnesota’s appellate 
courts.56 
 
 50. Conlon by Conlon v. Heckler, 719 F.2d 788, 795-96 (5th Cir. 1983). 
 51. 334 U.S. 541 (1948). 
 52. Id. at 549. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Conlon, 719 F.2d at 795-96.  See also Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 354 U.S. 416, 
418-19 (1957) (where wife not subject to Nevada jurisdiction, Nevada court could not 
extinguish right to support in another state even though not reduced to judgment in the 
other state); Estin, 334 U.S. at 549 (holding that a Nevada court lacking personal 
jurisdiction over wife could not terminate the husband’s preexisting obligation for 
support ordered in another state). 
 55. The Restatement of Conflict of Laws recognizes that an adjudication of status 
does not require personal jurisdiction.  It provides the following illustration: Assume that 
“A leaves his home in State X and goes to State Y, where he becomes domiciled and 
there obtains an ex parte divorce from B, his wife.  Assuming that the requirements of 
proper notice and of opportunity to be heard have been met, this divorce is valid and must 
be recognized in X under full faith and credit even though B was not personally subject to 
the jurisdiction of the Y court and at all times retained her domicile in X.”  RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 71 cmt. a, illus. 1 (1971). 
 56. See Larsen v. Erickson, 222 Minn. 363, 368, 24 N.W.2d 711, 714 (1946) (there 
was a complete severance of the marriage status, but no property rights were there 
determined, nor was there any provision for alimony); Sheridan v. Sheridan, 213 Minn. 
24, 27, 4 N.W.2d 785, 787 (1942) (citing Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U.S. 562, 567 
(1906)) (reciting established law that personal judgments rendered against non-residents 
without acquiring personal jurisdiction may not be enforced in another state by virtue of 
the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution); Rose v. Rose, 132 Minn. 340, 343, 
156 N.W. 664, 666 (1916) (upholding dissolution of the marriage “without regard to the 
14
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VIII. CONTINUING SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION 
Once a court has subject matter and personal jurisdiction over the 
parties to a divorce, does it ever lose that power?  The question usually 
arises when one of the parties to a divorce moves away and establishes a 
domicile outside Minnesota.57  A majority of jurisdictions have taken the 
view that they possess continuing jurisdiction.  Consequently, obligors 
who move from a jurisdiction where a judgment was properly entered, 
and remain away for several years, are usually unable to block 
modification or enforcement efforts on the ground that the forum court 
lost personal jurisdiction once they moved out-of-state.  Minnesota 
follows the majority rule. 
For example, in Bjordahl v. Bjordahl,58 the court held that even 
though the husband had not resided in Minnesota for twenty-two years 
and the parties’ children had reached majority, the court in which the 
divorce was granted under a stipulated judgment had continuing 
jurisdiction to modify or enforce the decree.  Observed Justice Simonett: 
Respondent argues that enforcement of a divorce judgment is a 
new and independent action, requiring independent 
jurisdictional contacts.  He cites a North Dakota case for this 
proposition, Zent v. Zent, 281 N.W.2d 41 (N.D.1979). But we 
held to the contrary in Atwood v. Atwood, 253 Minn. 185, 91 
N.W.2d 728 (1958), and see no reason to overrule that decision 
now.  In Atwood, we said: (A)n application for modification or 
enforcement of provisions of a divorce decree respecting 
divorce and custody of minor children is a supplementary 
proceeding, incidental to the original suit; it is not an 
independent proceeding or the commencement of a new action. 
The jurisdiction to order such modifications is a continuing 
one.  253 Minn. at 193, 91 N.W.2d at 734.  Though Atwood 
and cases following, Cummiskey v. Cummiskey, 259 Minn. 
427, 107 N.W.2d 864 (1961), and Zaine v. Zaine, 265 Minn. 
105, 120 N.W.2d 324 (1963), dealt with minor-age children, 
this is not to suggest that continuing jurisdiction is cut off 
when, as here, the children have reached the age of majority. A 
 
place of the marriage, or to that of the commission of the offense for which the divorce is 
granted”); Thurston v. Thurston, 58 Minn. 279, 285, 59 N.W. 1017, 1018 (1894) (stating 
that the court changed only the marriage status without affecting any property). 
 57. The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, the Uniform 
Interstate Family Support Act, and the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act all, of course, 
provide specific answers to this question.  See supra notes 5-6, 8. 
 58. 308 N.W.2d 817 (Minn. 1981). 
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divorce decree, by its nature, sets up continuing obligations; an 
effort to collect arrearages should not be barred jurisdictionally 
simply because the children are of age. The fact that future 
support payments are no longer required by the decree makes 
the obligation to pay the past-due support no less continuing.59 
There are no strong public policy reasons to suggest that Minnesota 
abandon its present view of continuing jurisdiction.  Furthermore, the 
question of exercising continuing jurisdiction in custody cases is now 
more fully addressed by the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and 
Enforcement Act (UCCJEA)60 and the Parental Kidnapping Prevention 
Act (PKPA).61  Continuing jurisdiction in child support matters is 
addressed in the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act.62 
IX. “STATUS THEORY” AND JURISDICTION 
Jurisdictions are increasingly using “status” as a theory upon which 
to adjudicate family law issues where personal jurisdiction cannot be 
obtained over an out-of-state defendant.  Expansive use of “status” 
places that theory into an apparent conflict with the Due Process Clause 
of the United States Constitution. 
It is a black letter principle of law that the Constitution “trumps” a 
state statute, and the legal question is whether application of the “status 
theory” runs afoul of the Constitution. The Constitutional due process 
issue arises initially from the Court’s decision in May v. Anderson.63 
There the father had obtained an ex parte Wisconsin divorce, which 
granted custody of the minor children to him.  He attempted to enforce 
the custody decree in Ohio, where the mother was now living, after she 
refused to return them to Wisconsin while exercising visitation.  The 
Court held that Ohio did not have to recognize the Wisconsin decree 
because it was entered without personal jurisdiction over the mother.  Of 
possible significance is the fact that the parties had stipulated in the 
divorce action that the children were domiciled in Wisconsin. 
Since the Court’s ruling, it has been subjected to considerable 
debate and criticism.64  Its critics have lauded Justice Jackson’s 
 
 59. Id. at 818. 
 60. MINN. STAT. §§ 518D.101-317 (2002). 
 61. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (2000). 
 62. MINN. STAT. §§ 518C.101-902 (2002). 
 63. 345 U.S. 528 (1953). 
 64. See Brigitte M. Bodenheimer & Janet Neeley-Kvarme, Jurisdiction Over Child 
Custody and Adoption After Shaffer and Kulko, 12 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 229 (1979); 
Brigitte M. Bodenheimer, The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act: A Legislative 
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dissenting opinion in which he stated in part: 
Custody is viewed not with the idea of adjudicating rights in 
the children, as if they were chattels, but rather with the idea of 
making the best disposition possible for the welfare of the 
children.  To speak of a court’s “cutting off” a mother’s right 
to custody of her children, as if it raised problems similar to 
those involved in “cutting off” her rights in a plot of ground, is 
to obliterate these obvious distinctions. Personal jurisdiction of 
all parties to be affected by a proceeding is highly desirable, to 
make certain that they have had valid notice and opportunity to 
be heard. But the assumption that it overrides all other 
considerations and in its absence a state is constitutionally 
impotent to resolve questions of custody flies in the face of our 
own cases.65 
Justice Frankfurter, in a concurring opinion, noted that although 
Ohio was not required to give full faith and credit to the Wisconsin order, 
the due process clause did not prohibit Ohio from recognizing it “as a 
matter of local law” or comity.66  The Second Restatement of Conflict of 
Laws accepts the Frankfurter interpretation of May v. Anderson as 
authoritative.67 
While there is authority to the contrary, a majority of courts 
considering this question appear to have rejected the plurality opinion in 
May v. Anderson and have accepted the status exception when 
considering child custody issues where personal jurisdiction cannot be 
obtained over one of the parties.  The state courts considering the issue 
have held that the state having the most significant connections with the 
child and his family will be permitted to make a custody adjudication in 
the absence of personal jurisdiction over a parent who does not reside in 
the forum state.68 
 
Remedy for Children Caught in the Conflict of Laws, 22 VAND. L. REV. 1207, 1232-33 
(1969). 
 65. May v Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 541 (1953) (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
 66. Id. at 535-36 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
 67. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 79 cmt. c. 
 68. See McArthur v. Superior Court, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 296, 298 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 
1991) (ruling that significant connection jurisdiction continues in the rendering state until 
the child and all parties have moved away); In re Marriage of Leonard, 175 Cal. Rptr. 
903, 912 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981) (holding that personal jurisdiction over the out-of-state 
parent is not required to make a binding custody determination); Burton v. Bishop, 269 
S.E.2d 417, 417-18 (Ga. 1980) (holding that under the Uniform Child Custody 
Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA), Georgia courts must recognize an Ohio custody decree despite 
the absence of personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state parent); Yearta v. Scroggins, 268 
S.E.2d 151, 153 (Ga. 1980) (noting that the public policy of the state is to recognize child 
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Tennessee rejected May v. Anderson on the ground that subsequent 
Supreme Court decisions have “abolished the distinctions between in 
rem and in personam” jurisdiction, and “recognized that exceptions can 
be made to the ‘minimum contacts’ standard” in “status” cases, such as 
child custody decisions.69  The court declared that a state “having the 
most significant connections with the child and his family will be 
permitted to make a custody adjudication even in the absence of personal 
jurisdiction over a parent who does not reside in the forum state.”70 
A Texas court, taking essentially the same view as Tennessee, 
explained that: 
[U]nlike adjudications of child support and visitation expense, 
custody determinations are status adjudications not dependent 
upon personal jurisdiction over the parents.  Generally, a 
family relationship is among those matters in which the forum 
state has such a strong interest that its courts may reasonably 
make an adjudication affecting that relationship even though 
one of the parties to the relationship may have had no personal 
contacts with the forum state.71 
The status exception has been extended in some jurisdictions to 
 
custody decrees where there is no personal jurisdiction under principles of comity); In re 
Marriage of Hudson, 434 N.E.2d 107, 117-18 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982) (recognizing that 
custody is an adjudication of a child’s status, which means that a court may adjudicate the 
matter without acquiring personal jurisdiction); Genoe v. Genoe,  500 A.2d 3, 8 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1985) (noting that the status of a child may be decided quasi in rem 
pursuant to the UCCJA and, therefore, custody and visitation orders can be made without 
regard to either parent’s personal jurisdiction); Hart v. Hart, 327 S.E.2d 631, 635-37 
(N.C. Ct. App. 1985) (finding a legitimate basis for determining custody based on the 
significant connection between the children and the state and noting that personal 
jurisdiction over the nonresident parent is not a UCCJA requirement); In re Matter of 
O’Connor, 690 P.2d 1095, 1097 (Or. Ct. App. 1984) (noting that a court may determine a 
custody dispute against a nonresident spouse over whom it cannot exercise personal 
jurisdiction); McAtee v. McAtee, 323 S.E.2d 611, 616-17 (W. Va. 1984) (noting that the 
status exception permits the court to adjudicate custody without obtaining personal 
jurisdiction over both parents). 
 69. Fernandez v. Fernandez, No. 85-194-II, 1986 WL 7935, at *1-*2  (Tenn. Ct. 
App. July 15, 1986).  See also Brown v. Brown, 847 S.W.2d 496, 499 n.2 (Tenn. 1993) 
(noting that the Supreme Court decision in May v. Anderson has largely been ignored and 
that neither the UCCJA nor the PKPA requires personal jurisdiction over the respondent). 
 70. Fernandez, 1986 WL 7935, at *2 (citation omitted).  See also Roderick v. 
Roderick, 776 S.W.2d 533, 535-36 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989) (noting that the UCCJA 
permits the courts of the state with the most significant contacts to make custody 
determinations even without personal jurisdiction over the nonresident parent). 
 71. In re Interest of S.A.V., 837 S.W.2d 80, 84 (Tex. 1992) (citations omitted).  See 
In re Marriage of Los, 593 N.E.2d 126, 129-30 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (choosing to follow 
the established precedent that status determinations do not require personal jurisdiction 
over the parents). 
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other family law areas including parental termination proceedings.72  The 
Oklahoma Supreme Court applied the status rationale when deciding a 
nonconsensual stepparent adoption dispute in In re Adoption of J.L.H.73  
There, the children’s natural father and stepmother petitioned the court 
for the nonconsensual adoption of the father’s children by the stepmother 
on the ground that their mother, a nonresident of Oklahoma, willfully 
failed to pay child support.  Finally, the theory has been applied by a 
majority of the Iowa Supreme Court to sustain the issuance of a 
protective order without first obtaining personal jurisdiction over a 
defendant.74 
Minnesota has applied the status rationale in interstate custody 
disputes, which is consistent with a majority of jurisdictions that have 
recently examined the issue.  For example, in Willmore v. Willmore,75 
the court held that in the absence of a conflicting court order from 
another jurisdiction, a wife, who was a Minnesota resident and who 
established domicile of her two children in Minnesota, could invoke the 
jurisdiction of Minnesota courts to determine custody of the children 
who were forcibly removed from the state by her estranged husband.  
The court said it possessed this power despite the fact that the ex-
husband was a nonresident, the wife had been unable to secure personal 
service upon him, and she did not know the precise address of the 
husband and children who were not in the jurisdiction. 
It is interesting to note that in an older decision, State ex rel. Larson 
v. Larson,76 the court concluded that proceedings to determine the 
custody of a minor child are in the nature of an action in rem, with the 
res being the status of the minor.  It stated that only the court of the state 
 
 72. See In re Appeal in Maricopa County, Juvenile Action No. JS-734, 543 P.2d 
454, 459-60 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1975) (concluding that the state acting in its parens patriae 
capacity is justified in providing for effective termination proceedings, even in the 
absence of in personam jurisdiction over a non-consenting parent); In re Interest of 
M.L.K., 768 P.2d 316, 319-20 (Kan. Ct. App. 1989) (determining that termination of 
parental rights is analogous to the termination of a marriage relationship and, therefore, is 
within the “status exception” to the minimum contacts rule); Wenz v. Schwartze, 598 
P.2d 1086, 1092 (Mont. 1979) (concluding personal jurisdiction over a parent is not 
necessary in order to terminate parental rights, without specifically discussing status 
exception); In re Adoption of Copeland, 43 S.W.3d 483, 487 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000) 
(relying on the status exception in parental rights termination proceeding against a father 
in prison); In re Interest of A.E.H., 468 N.W.2d 190, 198-200 (Wis. 1991) (focusing on 
child’s contacts with the state in order to terminate parental rights). 
 73. 737 P.2d 915 (Okla. 1987). 
 74. Bartsch v. Bartsch, 636 N.W.2d 3, 6 (Iowa 2001). 
 75. 273 Minn. 537, 143 N.W.2d 630 (1966). 
 76. 190 Minn. 489, 252 N.W. 329 (1934). 
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where the minor is domiciled possesses the power to fix or change that 
status. 
In Johnson v. Murray,77 a recent unpublished decision, the 
Minnesota Court of Appeals, in dictum, discussed the status principle 
and its application to a custody dispute.  It observed: 
Although we hold that the district court has personal 
jurisdiction over respondent, we note that under the Act, 
personal jurisdiction over a contestant outside the state may not 
be required for a court to determine the custody status of a 
child.  See, e.g., In re Marriage of Bueche, 550 N.E.2d 48, 51 
(Ill. App. 1990) (stating that personal jurisdiction over either 
parent is unnecessary for district court to issue custody order 
under UCCJA as long as jurisdictional requirements of Act are 
met); In re Marriage of Hudson, 434 N.E.2d 107, 118 (Ind. 
App. 1982) (stating that “in personam jurisdiction is not 
required under the Uniform Act”) (citations omitted). Because 
a custody determination is, in effect, an adjudication of the 
child’s status, courts have adjudicated custody under the Act 
without acquiring personal jurisdiction over absent contestants. 
In re Marriage of Hudson, 434 N.E.2d at 117. The Act 
requires, however, that contestants outside this state be given 
reasonable notice and an opportunity to be heard in the custody 
proceeding.  Minn. Stat. § 518A.04 (1998); Minn. Stat. § 
518A.05, subd. 1 (1998).78 
When the Minnesota Supreme Court later reversed Johnson v. 
Murray,79 it did not consider the question of personal jurisdiction.  
Rather, it focused exclusively on the Uniform Custody Jurisdiction and 
Enforcement Act and its application to the facts of the dispute. 
In conclusion, it appears that Minnesota has cautiously adopted the 
status theory in the area of custody disputes and, in doing so, has aligned 
itself with a majority of the courts in the nation on that issue.  It has not, 
however, squarely discussed the potential implications of May v. 
Anderson—which would be informative and useful. 
X. PERSONAL JURISDICTION—TRADITIONAL VIEW 
Unlike subject matter jurisdiction, which can never be waived, 
personal jurisdiction may be granted by the consent of the parties or 
 
 77. No. CX-99-2173, 2000 WL 1146338 (Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 7, 2000), rev’d in 
part, 648 N.W.2d 664 (Minn. 2002). 
 78. Id. at *3 (footnotes omitted). 
 79. 648 N.W.2d 664 (Minn. 2002). 
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waived through inaction.80  The distinction between subject matter and 
personal jurisdiction rests on the characterization of personal jurisdiction 
as a matter of individual liberty rather than as a statutorily defined 
limitation on a court’s power.81 The United States Supreme Court has 
stated that: 
The requirement that a court have personal jurisdiction flows 
not from Art. III, but from the Due Process Clause.  The 
personal jurisdiction requirement recognizes and protects an 
individual liberty interest.  It represents a restriction on judicial 
power not as a matter of sovereignty, but as a matter of 
individual liberty . . . .  Because the requirement of personal 
jurisdiction represents first of all an individual right, it can, like 
other such rights, be waived.82 
Service within the forum.  A long-standing principle is that a person 
becomes subject to personal jurisdiction when served with legal process 
while within the forum state. This applies even if the person served is an 
out-of-state resident who is only briefly within the forum state.83 
The traditional view of personal jurisdiction and service within the 
forum was discussed extensively in Burnham v. Superior Court.84  In 
that case, the wife brought a divorce action in California and served her 
husband with divorce papers when he visited their children in that state.  
The Court ruled that his physical presence within the state conferred 
personal jurisdiction over him—no additional “minimum contacts” were 
required. 
Justice Scalia, writing for a plurality of four, declared that 
“jurisdiction based on physical presence alone constitutes due process 
because it is one of the continuing traditions of our legal system that 
define the due process standard of ‘traditional notions of fair play and 
substantial justice.’ ”85  Three other justices concurred in an opinion filed 
by Justice Brennan.  In their view, tradition alone was not dispositive; 
they would judge the constitutionality of in-state service on a nonresident 
by examining contemporary notions of due process.86  However, the 
 
 80. See Huhn v. Foley Bros., 221 Minn. 279, 286, 22 N.W.2d 3, 8 (1946). 
 81. N. Cent. Servs., Inc. v. E. Communications, Inc., 379 N.W.2d 708, 710 (Minn. 
Ct. App. 1986). 
 82. Ins. Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie Des Bauxites, 456 U.S. 694, 702-03 (1982) 
(footnote omitted).  The Minnesota Court of Appeals has referenced this case.  N. Cent. 
Servs., Inc., 379 N.W.2d at 710. 
 83. Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 619 (1990). 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. See id. at 628-32 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
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justices ultimately concluded, “as a rule the exercise of personal 
jurisdiction over a defendant based on his voluntary presence in the 
forum will satisfy the requirements of due process.”87  They reasoned 
that by visiting the forum state, a defendant avails himself of significant 
benefits, such as the protection of his health and safety.88  Justice Stevens 
joined neither Justice Scalia’s nor Justice Brennan’s opinion, but 
concurred in the judgment based on considerations of history, fairness 
and common sense. 
Minnesota’s application of personal service within its borders is 
consistent with the views expressed in Burnham.  For example, in In re 
Marriage of Calhoun v. Rookstool,89 the ex-husband came to Minnesota 
to pick up his child for visitation and was personally served with his ex-
wife’s motion to modify child support.90  When challenging the exercise 
of personal jurisdiction, he attempted to distinguish Burnham on the 
ground that it applied only to service of a summons and complaint or 
petition and not to parties served with motion papers.91  In rejecting his 
claim, the court viewed Burnham as supporting the establishment of 
personal jurisdiction over him.92  There are no apparent strong public 
policy reasons for changing Minnesota’s view in this area. 
XI. WAIVING PERSONAL JURISDICTION 
General rule. As a general rule, a Minnesota district court may 
exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident if the individual submits 
to jurisdiction by consenting; entering a general appearance; or by filing 
a responsive document, which effectively waives any contest to personal 
jurisdiction.  The defense of personal jurisdiction is also deemed waived 
if not raised as a defense, made by motion, or included in a responsive 
pleading.93 
 
 87. Id. at 639. 
 88. See id. at 640. 
 89. 1995 WL 265047 (Minn. Ct. App. May 9, 1995). 
 90. Id. at *1. 
 91. Id. at *2. 
 92. Id. 
 93. See MINN. R. CIV. P. 12.08(a) (1)-(2).  See also Majestic Inc. v. Berry, 593 
N.W.2d 251, 258 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999).  In addition, Rule 12.08 does not “preclude 
waiver by implication.”  Patterson v. Wu Family Corp., 608 N.W.2d 863, 868 (Minn. 
2000) (citation omitted).  “[D]efendant waives the defense of insufficient service of 
process, even though asserted by answer, by affirmatively invoking the jurisdiction of the 
district court to obtain partial summary judgment without earlier or simultaneously 
moving to dismiss the complaint for insufficient service of process.”  Id. at 864 (footnote 
omitted).  It has long been the rule “that a party may, by consent, give jurisdiction over 
22
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Counterclaim.  The general rule applied to counterclaims is that 
when a party asserts a counterclaim, the party making the assertion 
automatically waives any claim that the court lacks personal jurisdiction.  
The waiver theory rests on the view that when the counterclaim is 
asserted, the party voluntarily invokes the power of the court on the 
party’s own behalf.  Therefore, the party’s conduct provides the court 
with jurisdiction. Courts also reason that it would be unsatisfactory to 
allow a defendant to challenge personal jurisdiction while seeking 
recovery on a counterclaim.  Moreover, it is thought unfair for a 
defendant to bind the adverse party to a result without being bound if the 
result proved unsatisfactory.94  To a limited extent, this rule of waiver 
has been modified by Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02.95 
Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure declare that “[n]o defense . . . is 
waived by being joined with one or more defenses in a responsive 
pleading or motion.”96  The Rules also declare that “[a] party may also 
state as many separate claims or defenses as the party has regardless of 
consistency.”97  Because of this language, the mere assertion of a 
counterclaim should no longer automatically result in a personal 
jurisdictional waiver.  However, the responding party must act quickly to 
preserve a personal jurisdiction challenge after asserting a 
counterclaim.98 
Failure to promptly challenge personal jurisdiction after asserting a 
counterclaim may result in a finding that the party has waived the 
 
his person, and it follows as a consequence that, where there is any defect of jurisdiction, 
or it has ceased, he may waive the objection, and does so when he takes or consents to 
any step in the cause which assumes that jurisdiction exists or continues.”  Quaker 
Creamery Co. v. Carlson, 124 Minn. 147, 150, 144 N.W. 449, 449 (1913).  “A party who 
takes or consents to any step in a proceeding which assumes that jurisdiction exists or 
continues has made a general appearance which subjects him to the jurisdiction of the 
court.”  Slayton Gun Club v. Town of Shetek, 286 Minn. 461, 467, 176 N.W.2d 544, 548 
(1970) (citation omitted). 
 94. Federal-Hoffman, Inc. v. Fackler, 549 N.W.2d 93, 95 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996).  
See Morehart v. Furley, 149 Minn. 56, 57, 182 N.W. 723, 724 (1921).  See also Peterson 
v. Eishen, 512 N.W.2d 338, 340 (Minn. 1994) (“[A] defendant submits to the jurisdiction 
of the court” by taking “some affirmative step invoking the power of the court or 
implicitly recognizing its jurisdiction.”); Ceminsky v. Mardell, 385 N.W.2d 888, 891 
(Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (making a counterclaim and third-party complaint results in 
waiver of personal jurisdiction defense). 
 95. See Federal-Hoffman, Inc., 549 N.W.2d at 95. 
 96. MINN. R. CIV. P. 12.02.  The rule mandates that counterclaims be asserted in any 
required responsive pleading. 
 97. MINN. R. CIV. P. 8.05(b). 
 98. See MINN. R. CIV. P. 12.08(a) (covering preservation of certain defenses, 
including lack of personal jurisdiction). 
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imperfection.  A party who fails to act quickly may be viewed as 
demonstrating a willingness to “invoke[] the power of the court in his 
own behalf.”99  As a consequence of the party’s inaction, he or she is 
viewed as waiving the jurisdictional defense and having forfeited the 
flexibility of modern pleading recognized by the court.100 
Crossclaims.  In Johnson Bros. Corp. v. Arrowhead Co.,101 the 
court applied the above analysis to crossclaims and concluded that the 
mere assertion of a crossclaim “does not [automatically] waive a 
properly raised jurisdictional defense.”102 
Discovery. A party who properly challenges the court’s jurisdiction 
does not waive that defense by subsequent participation in the discovery 
process.103 
Custody Modification Actions.  Under certain conditions, a 
nonresident who brings a child custody modification motion in 
Minnesota is not subject to a court’s power to hear other actions such as 
child support.  For example, in Ferguson v. Ferguson104 the court held 
that the ex-husband did not consent to Minnesota’s exercise of personal 
jurisdiction over him despite his efforts to seek assistance from its courts 
on several separate occasions.105 
The dispute involved a court battle between a financially destitute 
mother, who had custody of the couple’s two children, and her ex-
husband, a well-to-do Montana physician.  The mother left Montana for 
Minnesota several years earlier in violation of a Montana court order.  
After she left Montana, her ex-husband successfully brought two change-
of-custody motions and obtained an ex parte motion regarding visitation 
in Minnesota.  He also appeared at a hearing in Minnesota where he 
successfully defended the ex parte action.  Both the trial judge and the 
Minnesota Court of Appeals rejected the mother’s argument that by his 
behavior he had consented to Minnesota’s exercise of jurisdiction over 
him.  The court of appeals observed: 
Ferguson’s principal contention appears to be that J. Paul 
Ferguson consented to personal jurisdiction of the Minnesota 
 
 99. See Morehart, 149 Minn. at 57, 182 N.W. at 724 (citations omitted). 
 100. Federal-Hoffman, Inc., 549 N.W.2d at 95-96. 
 101. 459 N.W.2d 160 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990). 
 102. Id. at 163. 
 103. See Anderson v. Mikel Drilling Co., 257 Minn. 487, 495-96, 102 N.W.2d 293, 
300 (1960); Wilkie v. Allied Van Lines, Inc., 398 N.W.2d 607, 611 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1986). 
 104. 411 N.W.2d 238 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987). 
 105. Id. at 239-41. 
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courts by bringing motions involving custody and visitation 
matters.  We recognize that the requirement of personal 
jurisdiction is an individual right which can be waived. 
However, J. Paul Ferguson did not choose to avail himself of 
the Minnesota courts; he was forced to do so by the fact that Ila 
Ferguson had moved to Minnesota with the children in 
violation of a court order, which resulted in Minnesota gaining 
custody jurisdiction as the “home state” of the children. 
Accordingly, he had no choice but to appear in the Minnesota 
courts to enforce his visitation rights.  See Minn. Stat. § 
518A.02(b) (1986) (custody matters include visitation 
rights).106 
As a practical matter, the issue of modifying custody is now 
controlled by the UCCJEA and the PKPA.  Whether Minnesota will 
reject finding jurisdiction in future cases because of parental misconduct 
is problematic. 
XII. PERSONAL JURISDICTION: SPOUSE’S RESIDENCE 
Minnesota courts have held in several older decisions that a wife’s 
domicile is that of her husband’s.107  The court viewed a husband “as 
head of the family, [therefore] it is for the husband to determine and fix 
the domicile of the family, including that of the wife . . . .”108  A wife 
could establish a separate domicile only if her husband failed to establish 
one for her.109  However, this outmoded view is no longer recognized. 
For example, in Tureson v. Tureson,110 the court recognized that for 
the purpose of creating a jurisdictional basis for divorce, a wife may 
establish and maintain a residence or domicile separate from that of her 
husband during the marriage.111  Jones v. Jones112 ended any speculation 
about this point. 
XIII. PERSONAL JURISDICTION: CHILD’S DOMICILE 
Because children are legally incapable of forming the intent 
 
 106. Id. at 240 (citations omitted). 
 107. See, e.g., State ex rel. Larson v. Larson, 190 Minn. 489, 491, 252 N.W. 329, 330 
(1934) (citations omitted). 
 108. Kramer v. Lamb, 84 Minn. 468, 471, 87 N.W. 1024, 1025-26 (1901) (citing 
Williams v. Moody, 35 Minn. 280, 28 N.W. 510 (1886)). 
 109. See Gussman v. Rogers, 190 Minn. 153, 157, 251 N.W. 18, 19 (1933). 
 110. 281 Minn. 107, 160 N.W.2d 552 (1968). 
 111. See id. 
 112. 402 N.W.2d 146, 148 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987). 
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necessary to establish a domicile, they take the same domicile as their 
parents.113  If a child is born out-of-wedlock, the child takes the domicile 
of his or her mother.114 
XIV. PERSONAL JURISDICTION: PRETRIAL BURDEN 
When a defendant challenges personal jurisdiction at the pretrial 
stage, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to make a prima facie showing of 
minimum contacts through its complaint and supporting evidence, 
“which will be taken as true.”115  In questionable cases, doubt is resolved 
in favor of retaining jurisdiction.116  An order denying a pretrial motion 
for dismissal based upon a lack of personal jurisdiction is “appealable as 
a matter of right.”117 
XV. CONFLICT OF LAW 
When a couple marries in one state, but divorce in Minnesota, 
Minnesota law normally applies.118 
XVI. SPECIAL SERVICE OF PROCESS PROVISIONS 
In order to increase the possibility of gaining jurisdiction over a 
party who is within the state but difficult to serve, the legislature 
promulgated Minnesota Statutes section 543.20, which states that: 
[I]n addition to the methods of service of process provided in 
the rules of civil procedure, service of a summons, an order to 
show cause, or an order or judgment within this state may also 
be made upon an individual by delivering a copy to the 
individual personally at the individual’s place of employment 
or at a post-secondary education institution in which the 
individual is enrolled. The employer shall make the individual 
available for the purpose of delivering a copy. The post-
secondary education institution must make the individual’s 
class schedule available to the process server or make the 
 
 113. See In re Pratt, 219 Minn. 414, 421, 18 N.W.2d 147, 151-52 (1945). 
 114. Id. 
 115. See Marquette Nat’l Bank v. Norris, 270 N.W.2d 290, 292 (Minn. 1978) (citing 
Hardrives, Inc. v. City of LaCrosse, Wis., 307 Minn. 290, 293, 240 N.W.2d 814, 816 
(1976) (citing Wuertz v. Garvey, 287 Minn. 353, 178 N.W.2d 630 (1970)). 
 116. Hardrives, 307 Minn. at 296, 240 N.W.2d at 818. 
 117. Wheeler v. Teufel, 443 N.W.2d 555, 556 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989) (citing In re 
State & Regents Bldg. Asbestos Cases, 435 N.W.2d 521, 522 (Minn. 1989). 
 118. See, e.g.,  DeLa Rosa v. DeLa Rosa, 309 N.W.2d 755, 756 n.1 (Minn. 1981). 
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individual available for the purpose of delivering a copy.  No 
employer or post-secondary education institution shall deny a 
process server admittance to the employer’s or post-secondary 
education institution’s premises for the purpose of making 
service under this section.119 
Service of process must be made personally on the individual.  The 
statute applies to an action for dissolution, annulment, legal separation, 
or a proceeding under the Parentage Act.  It can be used in actions under 
both Minnesota Statutes section 256.87 and the Uniform Interstate 
Family Support Act (UIFSA)120 and for contempt of court for failure to 
pay child support.  Other uses include service of petitions under the 
Domestic Abuse Act and motions, orders and judgments for the payment 
of child support, should a court order personal service of them.121 
An employer may not discharge or otherwise discipline an 
employee, nor shall a post-secondary education institution dismiss or 
discipline a student as a result of service under this section.122 
XVII. LONG-ARM STATUTE—GENERAL 
When a court considers exercising jurisdiction over a nonresident, 
two requirements must be met.  First, the language placed by the 
legislature in a long-arm statute must be satisfied.123  Second, “minimum 
 
 119. MINN. STAT. § 543.20, subd. 1 (2002). 
 120. MINN. STAT. §§ 518C.101-.902 (2002). 
 121. MINN. STAT. § 543.20, subd. 2 (2002). 
 122. § 543.20, subd. 1. 
 123. See generally MINN. STAT. § 543.19 (2002), which reads: 
543.19. Personal jurisdiction over nonresidents 
Subdivision 1. As to a cause of action arising from any acts enumerated in 
this subdivision, a court of this state with jurisdiction of the subject matter 
may exercise personal jurisdiction over any foreign corporation or any 
nonresident individual, or the individual’s personal representative, in the 
same manner as if it were a domestic corporation or the individual were a 
resident of this state. This section applies if, in person or through an agent, 
the foreign corporation or nonresident individual: (a) Owns, uses, or 
possesses any real or personal property situated in this state, or (b) Transacts 
any business within the state, or (c) Commits any act in Minnesota causing 
injury or property damage, or (d) Commits any act outside Minnesota 
causing injury or property damage in Minnesota, subject to the following 
exceptions when no jurisdiction shall be found: (1) Minnesota has no 
substantial interest in providing a forum; or (2) the burden placed on the 
defendant by being brought under the state’s jurisdiction would violate 
fairness and substantial justice; or (3) the cause of action lies in defamation 
or privacy.  Subd. 2. The service of process on any person who is subject to 
the jurisdiction of the courts of this state, as provided in this section, may be 
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contacts” must exist between the defendant and Minnesota in order to 
satisfy due process124—that is, there must be sufficient contacts between 
the defendant and Minnesota to satisfy “traditional notions of fair play 
and substantial justice.”125 
The advent and growth of long-arm statutes represents an attempt 
by Minnesota to provide a litigation forum for the convenience of its own 
citizens at the expense of citizens of other states.  The statutes are an 
outgrowth of a mobile, industrialized society that has reduced the time 
and difficulty once associated with travel from Minnesota to other states 
in the United States. 
The language used by legislatures when drafting long-arm statutes 
varies from state to state, and when initially encountered it may appear 
that the legislature has ignored domestic matters.126  However, state 
courts have found creative ways to construe the statutes to encompass 
domestic disputes.  They have seized upon phrases such as “transacting 
business” or “tortious conduct,” and found them applicable to domestic 
disputes.  For example, in Prybolsky v. Prybolsky,127 a Delaware family 
court held that it had acquired jurisdiction under that state’s long-arm 
statute over a nonresident husband involved in a domestic dispute by 
means of the “doing business” language in its long-arm statute.128  It 
reasoned that marriage is a contract and that support and other rights 
springing from that contract have financial and business implications.129  
Therefore, the phrase “doing business” encompassed a marital 
 
made by personally serving the summons upon the defendant outside this 
state with the same effect as though the summons had been personally served 
within this state.  Subd. 3. Only causes of action arising from acts 
enumerated in subdivision 1 may be asserted against a defendant in an action 
in which jurisdiction over the defendant is based upon this section.  Subd. 4. 
Nothing contained in this section shall limit or affect the right to serve any 
process in any other manner now or hereafter provided by law or the 
Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure.  Subd. 5. Nonresident individual, as 
used in this section, means any individual, or the individual’s personal 
representative, who is not domiciled or residing in the state when suit is 
commenced. 
For child support actions involving out-of-state defendants, see MINN. STAT. § 518C 
(2002). 
 124. Rostad v. On-Deck, Inc., 372 N.W.2d 717, 719 (Minn. 1985) (citing Int’l Shoe 
Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)). 
 125. Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940). 
 126. See, e.g., supra note 123, which sets out Minnesota’s general long-arm statute. 
 127. 430 A.2d 804 (Del. Fam. Ct. 1981); superseded by statute as stated in T.L. v. 
W.L., 820 A.2d 506, 508-09 (Del. Fam. Ct. 2003). 
 128. Id. at 807. 
 129. Id. 
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relationship.130 
The phrase “tortious act,” which is common in long-arm statutes, 
has been applied in several jurisdictions to encompass domestic 
matters.131  Minnesota has determined that civil proceedings to establish 
paternity involve “ ‘tortious conduct’ within the meaning of the long-arm 
statute,”132 and has given a broad application to this phrase.  For 
example, in Hughs ex rel. Praul v. Cole,133 the court held that the long-
arm statute involved “tortious conduct” and reached a nonresident father 
because of the effects of physical and emotional abuse occurring in 
Minnesota despite the fact the alleged abuse occurred in Pennsylvania.134 
There are some indications from opinions involving Minnesota’s 
long-arm statute that whether a court will consider applying it to a 
particular situation may depend on the court’s focus; for example, 
whether it concentrates on the injury to the victim or the conduct of the 
parents.  For example, in Ferguson v. Ferguson,135 discussed earlier in 
this article, the court was unable to find a tort having been committed 
within Minnesota where the ex-wife brought a child support modification 
action in the state.  The court rested its decision primarily on the conduct 
of the custodial mother who had fled Montana in violation of a court 
order years earlier—it did not focus on the damage suffered to the child 
as a result of a lack of child support. 
In a subsequent decision, Impola v. Impola,136 the court suggested 
that damages for the purposes of long-arm jurisdiction suffered by a 
child because of non-support turned on whether the child was born in 
Minnesota.  The court stated: 
Although paternity has been denominated a tort within the 
 
 130. Id. 
 131. See Poindexter v. Willis, 231 N.E.2d 1, 3 (Ill. App. Ct. 1967).  Accord In re 
Marriage of Highsmith, 488 N.E.2d 1000, 1003 (Ill. 1986) (citations omitted); Black v. 
Rasile, 318 N.W.2d 475, 476 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982); State ex rel. Nelson v. Nelson, 298 
Minn. 438, 441-42, 216 N.W.2d 140, 143 (1974) (citing Baxter v. Coughlin, 70 Minn. 1, 
72 N.W. 797 (1897)); In re Custody of Miller, 548 P.2d 542, 546 (Wash. 1976).  See also 
Leonard G. Ratner, Child Custody in a Federal System, 62 MICH. L. REV. 795, 839 
(1964). 
 132. Ulmer v. O’Malley, 307 N.W.2d 775, 777 (Minn.1981). See also Nelson, 298 
Minn. at 442, 216 N.W.2d at 143. 
 133. 572 N.W.2d 747 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997). 
 134. See id.at 750.  See also Howells v. McKibben, 281 N.W.2d 154, 156-57 (Minn. 
1979) (holding the failure of a father who resides in Wisconsin to pay child support to his 
child in Minnesota is tortious conduct, subjecting him to personal jurisdiction in 
Minnesota). 
 135. 411 N.W.2d 238 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987). 
 136. 464 N.W.2d 296 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990). 
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scope of the long-arm statute, we have drawn a distinction 
between paternity actions and actions for dissolution or for 
modification of child support which do not involve a 
complainant’s injury within the State of Minnesota. In 
Mahoney, this court held that statutory authority under the 
long-arm statute did not extend to reach a nonresident 
respondent in a dissolution action such that the trial court had 
jurisdiction to render judgment with respect to spousal 
maintenance, property settlement or attorney fees.  Similarly, 
in Ferguson v. Ferguson, we held the long-arm statute did not 
provide statutory authority to reach a nonresident parent to 
modify a child support order. 
However, we believe the facts of the instant action compel the 
trial court to assume jurisdiction.  In neither Mahoney nor 
Ferguson did the complainant sufficiently establish her injury 
within the state to support the trial court’s exercise of 
jurisdiction.  In contrast, the conduct giving rise to MI’s birth 
and appellant’s injury took place while respondent was a 
resident of Minnesota and occurred at all times within the 
state.  Of critical importance is that the conception took place 
in Minnesota, that respondent acknowledged paternity within 
the state, and that respondent was a resident when the child 
was conceived, during the pregnancy, and at times 
thereafter.137 
However, the injury to a child in terms of non-support is the same 
whether it is born inside or outside of Minnesota—the key issue is 
whether the child resides in Minnesota.  The distinction made by the 
court appears unwarranted. 
In H.A.W. v. Manuel,138 the Minnesota Court of Appeals focused on 
the injury.  There, Minnesota children were allegedly assaulted by a 
participant in a cultural exchange program outside of the state and the 
children sought recovery within the state.139  The court observed that the 
injury to the Minnesota children and the consent signed by a defendant 
met the requirements of Minnesota’s long-arm statute,140 and stated: 
Minnesota’s statutes include a “long arm” statute which 
authorizes jurisdiction over any nonresident who “[c]ommits 
any act outside of Minnesota causing injury or property 
damage in Minnesota,” subject to several exceptions. Minn. 
 
 137. Id. at 298-99 (full citations omitted). 
 138. 524 N.W.2d 10 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994). 
 139. Id. at 11-12. 
 140. See id. at 12. 
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Stat. § 543.19, subd. 1(d) (1992) . . . . 
In this instance, if we assume the facts alleged by respondents, 
the long-arm statute applies. According to these facts, appellant 
committed an act outside of Minnesota; he signed consent 
forms which allowed his son to visit here.  This fulfills the first 
half of section 543.19, subd. 1(d).  In addition, appellant’s act 
allegedly caused injuries to respondents’ children in 
Minnesota; if appellant had not signed the forms, his son could 
not have abused respondents’ children.  This appears to satisfy 
the second half of section 543.19, subd. 1(d).  Thus, based on 
the given facts, respondents’ claim passes the first test and we 
apply the constitutional analysis.141 
Paternity actions raise troubling issues regarding application of the 
language in Minnesota’s general long-arm statute.  Minnesota has held 
that failure to provide child support is sufficient to constitute a “tortious 
act” within the meaning of its long-arm statute.142  It rejected the thesis 
that jurisdiction in paternity proceedings was not contemplated by the 
long-arm statute because no such cause of action was recognized as a tort 
at common law and because no “injury or property damage” is 
involved.143 
Several jurisdictions that have examined this issue disagree with 
Minnesota.144  They accept the argument that no tortious conduct may 
occur until the alleged tortfeasor has been established as the child’s 
father and then assigned a duty of support.  They reason that until the 
duty of support is established, no tort can be committed; therefore, “[t]o 
saddle a defendant with the burden of child support before paternity has 
been established would be both illogical and unjust.”145  Furthermore, a 
 
 141. Id. at 12. 
 142. State ex rel. Nelson v. Nelson, 298 Minn. 438, 216 N.W.2d 140 (1974). 
 143. Id. at 440, 216 N.W.2d at 142. 
 144. See, e.g., Lightell v. Lightell, 394 S.2d 41, 42-43 (Ala. Civ. App. 1981) 
(requiring jurisdiction even after finding paternity); A.R.B. v. G.L.P., 507 P.2d 468, 469 
(Colo. 1973); Fla. Dep’t of Health & Rehab. Servs. ex rel. Luke v. Wright, 522 So. 2d 
838, 840 (Fla. 1988); Boyer v. Boyer, 383 N.E.2d 223, 226-27 (Ill. 1978); Duncan v. 
Duncan, 419 N.E.2d 700, 701 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981); State ex rel. Carrington v. Schutts, 535 
P.2d 982, 984 (Kan. 1975); State ex rel. Larimore v. Snyder, 291 N.W.2d 241, 244 (Neb. 
1980); Anonymous v. Anonymous, 428 N.Y.S.2d 608, 611 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1980).  See 
also Davis v. Davis, 452 F. Supp. 44, 46 (D.C. Pa. 1978) (holding that a long-arm statute 
providing jurisdiction over a nonresident whose out-of-state action [not omission] causes 
harm within the state requires affirmative misconduct and not mere nonfeasance, and 
does not apply to actions to enforce a foreign separation agreement for overdue support 
payments). 
 145. Luke, 522 So. 2d at 840. 
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court may not, as an initial matter, assume a defendant is the father of a 
child so that the matter of nonsupport can be adjudicated, and upon 
finding nonsupport, convert a failure to pay child support into “tortious 
conduct which then justifies adjudicating the matter.146 
In conclusion, the application of Minnesota’s long-arm statute 
appears to turn on whether the court focuses squarely on the injury to a 
child or the conduct of a parent.  This distinction should be reexamined 
in light of a strong public policy to protect children, which would always 
focus on the damage to the child.  Whether the long-arm statute should 
continue to apply to paternity actions is another intriguing question that 
remains open for Minnesota courts to revisit. 
XVIII. DUE PROCESS BARRIERS 
TO THE EXERCISE OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION 
Although Minnesota’s general long-arm statute has been construed 
as applicable to domestic disputes, the United States Constitution may 
nevertheless prevent its application.  “The Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment operates as a limitation on the exercise of 
jurisdiction of state courts to enter judgments affecting the rights or 
interests of nonresident defendants.”147  Although the language in a long-
arm statute may give a state court power to bring an out-of-state 
defendant before it, the question remains whether application of the 
statute exceeds the constitutional limitations imposed on the state by the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  A court must be satisfied that application of the 
long-arm statute meets the “minimum contacts” test.  In International 
Shoe Co. v. Washington,148 the following due process test was 
established: 
Due process requires only that in order to subject a defendant 
to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the 
territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with 
it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 
“traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.”149 
In Kulko v. California, the court applied this test to an effort made 
by an ex-wife located in California to increase a child support award 
when her ex-husband lived in New York.150  The facts briefly follow. 
 
 146. Id. 
 147. Kulko v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 436 U.S. 84, 91 (1978). 
 148. 326 U.S. 310 (1945). 
 149. Id. at 316 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
 150. 436 U.S. at 92. 
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After their separation, the ex-husband remained in New York, the 
state of marital domicile, and the ex-wife moved to California.151  The 
couple executed a separation agreement in New York that provided that 
the parties’ two children were to reside with Mr. Kulko in New York 
during the school year and with their mother during their Christmas, 
Easter, and summer vacations.152  Mr. Kulko also agreed to pay $3000 a 
year in child support.153  The terms of this agreement were later 
incorporated into a Haitian divorce decree obtained by Mrs. Kulko.154 
Subsequently, the parties’ daughter expressed a desire to live full 
time with her mother.155  Mr. Kulko acquiesced and paid the child’s 
airfare to California.156  A few years later, the couple’s son expressed to 
his mother a desire to live with her.157  Without Mr. Kulko’s knowledge, 
Mrs. Kulko sent her son a plane ticket, which he used to join his mother 
and sister in California.158 
With both children now residing with her in California, Mrs. Kulko 
filed suit in that state to obtain increased child support.159  Mr. Kulko 
resisted on the ground that he had insufficient contacts to warrant the 
California court’s assertion of personal jurisdiction over him.160  The 
California Supreme Court rejected this argument, reasoning that by 
sending his daughter to reside permanently in California, he had 
purposely availed himself of the benefits and protections of the laws of 
that state.161 
The United States Supreme Court rejected this argument, stating 
that the mere fact that Mr. Kulko “acquiesced” in the desire of his 
daughter to live with her mother was not a sufficient contact with 
California to warrant imposition of the unreasonable burden of litigating 
a child support action there.162  The Court observed that there was no 
other activity that would bring Mr. Kulko in contact with California.163  
It also stated that the former wife was not without remedy, as she could 
 
 151. Id. at 86-87. 
 152. Id. at 87. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. at 87-88. 
 157. Id. at 88. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. at 89. 
 162. Id. at 97-98. 
 163. See id. at 100-01. 
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initiate a proceeding under the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of 
Support Act “and have its merits adjudicated in the State of the alleged 
obligor’s residence, without either party’s having to leave his or her own 
State.”164 
Minnesota follows Kulko but applies a five-part test to help 
determine whether due process bars application of its long-arm 
statutes.165  The first three factors of that test are of primary 
consideration.166 The factors are: 
(1) the quantity of the defendant’s contacts with the state; 
(2) the nature and quality of the contacts; 
(3) the connection of the cause of action with those contacts; 
(4) the interest of the state in providing a forum; and 
(5) convenience to the parties.167 
When evaluating the nature and quality of the contacts, a court must 
determine whether the respondent (defendant) “purposefully availed” 
itself of the benefits and protections of Minnesota law.168  Requiring 
purposeful availment ensures that a respondent (defendant) will not have 
to appear in a jurisdiction solely because of “attenuated contacts” or the 
“unilateral activity of another party or third person.169  Minnesota has 
said that the reach of Minnesota’s long-arm jurisdiction should not be 
such that “anyone who deals with a Minnesota resident in any way . . . 
can be brought into the Minnesota courts to respond to a suit.”170 
Purposeful availment may be established through the “stream-of-
commerce theory,” whereby a state asserts personal jurisdiction over a 
business if that business “delivers its products into the stream of 
commerce with the expectation that they will be purchased by consumers 
in the forum state.”171  However, “stream of commerce” is not limited to 
 
 164. Id. at 99. 
 165. Dent-Air, Inc. v. Beech Mountain Air Serv., Inc., 332 N.W.2d 904, 907 (Minn. 
1983) (citing Aftanase v. Econ. Baler Co., 343 F.2d 187, 197 (8th Cir. 1965) and Vikse v. 
Flaby, 316 N.W.2d 276, 282 (Minn. 1982). 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. at 907. 
 168. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985) (citing Keeton v. 
Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 774 (1984); Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, 
S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 417 (1984); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 
U.S. 286, 299 (1980)). 
 169. Id. 
 170. Wa1ker Mgmt., Inc. v. FHC Enters., Inc., 446 N.W.2d 913, 914 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 1989) (quoting McQuay, Inc. v. Samuel Schlosberg, Inc., 321 F. Supp. 902, 906 (D. 
Minn. 1971)). 
 171. Rostad v. On-Deck, Inc., 372 N.W.2d 717, 720 (Minn. 1985) (quoting World-
Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297-98).  See also Real Prop., Inc. v. Mission Ins. Co., 427 
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commercial activity, and includes “any purposeful acts by an individual, 
whether personal, private, or commercial.”172 
Minnesota’s personal jurisdiction decisions in the family law arena 
following Kulko v. California appear occasionally inconsistent.  For 
example, in H.A.W. v. Manuel,173 discussed earlier in relation to 
construction of Minnesota’s long-arm statute,174 the court found that 
there were not sufficient minimum contacts to satisfy due process where 
the defendant’s only contact with Minnesota was when he consented to 
his son’s participation in a cultural exchange program.  Observed the 
court: 
The facts of the current case indicate a far more attenuated 
contact than that found in Kulko.  Unlike Kulko, appellant has 
never been in this country, let alone the forum state. In 
addition, appellant consented only to a short visit by his son, 
not to permanent residence.  Thus, the reasoning of Kulko 
applies with even greater force here. Appellant’s consent to his 
son’s desire to participate in a cultural exchange does not 
amount to purposeful availment of the benefits and protection 
of Minnesota law and does not constitute a sufficient contact to 
justify jurisdiction in this state.175 
In Ulmer v. O’Malley,176 the court refused to extend jurisdiction to 
an alleged out-of-state father of a child born out of wedlock.177  It held 
that due process prevented Minnesota from exercising personal 
jurisdiction because the putative father’s relationship with the child’s 
mother had occurred entirely in South Dakota, the child was conceived 
there, and the mother moved to Minnesota when she was approximately 
seven months pregnant.178  The putative father had neither visited nor 
called the mother in Minnesota and his only contacts with Minnesota 
consisted of his attorney’s responses to adoption agency’s requests for 
cooperation.179 
In another Minnesota decision, Sherburne County ex rel. Pouliet v. 
 
N.W.2d 665, 668 (Minn. 1988). 
 172. Ross v. Ross, 358 N.E.2d 437, 439 (Mass. 1976) (citing Van Wagenberg v. Van 
Wagenberg, 215 A.2d 812 (Md. 1966)). 
 173. 524 N.W.2d 10 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994). 
 174. See supra note 140 and accompanying text. 
 175. Manuel, 524 N.W.2d at 14. 
 176. 307 N.W.2d 775 (Minn. 1981). 
 177. Id. at 777-78.  The relationship developed in South Dakota.  Id. at 777. 
 178. Id. at 777. 
 179. Id. 
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Kennedy,180 the alleged father, a Montana resident, engaged in a single 
act of consensual intercourse with the mother, a Minnesota citizen, 
during a visit to Minnesota.181  Following the birth of a child in 
Minnesota, an action was begun here against the alleged father to 
determine responsibility for medical expenses related to the birth and to 
establish child support.182  The Minnesota Court of Appeals held that 
while the long-arm statute applied, neither the nature nor the quality of 
the contact satisfied due process.183 
In Brown County Family Service Center v. Miner,184 the alleged 
father of a child born to a woman in Minnesota had never physically 
been within the state.185  However, he sent letters to a Minnesota address 
and also made a few telephone calls to Minnesota.186  The Court of 
Appeals held that these contacts were not sufficient to give Minnesota 
personal jurisdiction over him as they failed to satisfy the minimum 
contacts tests.187  The court noted that the father could not have 
anticipated being required to defend a paternity action in Minnesota 
based on a few phone calls and letters sent to Minnesota addresses.  
Moreover, the contacts were “not directly connected to the underlying 
action and did not occur until eight months after the contact,” which led 
to the paternity action.188 
In contrast to these decisions is Hughs ex rel. Praul v. Cole,189 
which was discussed earlier in regard to Minnesota’s long-arm statute.190  
In Cole, the mother sought an order of protection on behalf of a child, 
who was allegedly physically abused by his nonresident father during 
out-of-state visits. The Minnesota Court of Appeals held that personal 
jurisdiction could be asserted over a nonresident father consistent with 
due process based solely on child’s suffering the effects of abuse in 
Minnesota and minimum contacts associated with father’s relationship 
with his son. 
 
 180. 409 N.W.2d 907 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987), aff’d, 426 N.W.2d 866 (Minn. 1988). 
 181. Id. at 908. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. at 909-10. 
 184. 419 N.W.2d 117 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988). 
 185. Id. at 118. 
 186. Id. 
 187. See id. at 119 (citing West American Insurance Co. v. Westin, Inc., 337 N.W.2d 
676, 679 (Minn. 1983) (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 
286, 297 (1980))). 
 188. Id. 
 189. 572 N.W.2d 747 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997). 
 190. See supra note 132 and accompanying text. 
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Although one understands the concern courts have with situations 
such as those found in Cole, the reasoning supporting the proposition that 
personal jurisdiction can be exercised over the nonresident father is not 
particularly strong.  For example, it is doubtful that a court would allow 
Minnesota to exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident where the 
nonresident and the Minnesota resident were involved in an auto accident 
in the nonresident’s state and the nonresident had no contact in 
Minnesota.  However, because the action in Cole involved child abuse, 
the court concluded there was jurisdiction, suggesting that jurisdiction 
may turn on the nature of the cause of action. 
In contrast to Minnesota, California has held that a single sexual 
encounter between a citizen and an out-of-state citizen that results in a 
parentage claim provides sufficient minimum contacts to give its courts 
personal jurisdiction over the out-of-state citizen.  For example, in 
County of Humboldt v. Harris191 a child was conceived when the 
plaintiff and father had intercourse in California in 1984.192  While the 
father admitted the sexual encounter, he maintained that since 1982 he 
had been a resident of Nevada and that California could not exercise 
personal jurisdiction over him.193  The California Court of Appeals 
disagreed.194  It observed that under Section 7007, a part of the Uniform 
Parentage Act, which is codified in California, that “[a] person who has 
sexual intercourse in this state thereby submits to the jurisdiction of the 
courts of this state as to an action brought under this part with respect to 
a child who may have been conceived by that act of intercourse.”195  It 
also observed that the sexual act imposed a substantial burden upon the 
plaintiff and, where the plaintiff is impecunious, upon the state.196  
Furthermore, the court held that application of the statute was not barred 
by the due process clause.197  California’s reasoning appears more 
persuasive on this point than that of Minnesota—a single sexual 
encounter in Minnesota should subject the alleged putative father to an 
action to establish support in this state.  This is an area that Minnesota 
should revisit. 
 
 191. 254 Cal. Rptr. 49 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988). 
 192. Id. at 50. 
 193. Id. at 51. 
 194. Id. 
 195. Id. at 51-52. 
 196. Id. at 52. 
 197. Id. 
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XIX. UNIFORM INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT 
Jurisdiction. The Uniform Interstate Family Support Act 
(UIFSA)198 generally applies to interstate child and spousal-support 
orders.199  Its purpose is to unify state laws relating to the establishment, 
enforcement, and modification of child support orders.200  A Minnesota 
court may exercise jurisdiction over a nonresident in an action to modify 
a support order if the individual submits to the jurisdiction of this state 
by consent, by entering a general appearance, or by filing a responsive 
document having the effect of waiving any contest to personal 
jurisdiction.201  When a foreign support order exists, a Minnesota court 
may modify it only if it finds, among other things, that (1) the child, the 
obligee, and the obligor do not reside in the issuing state; and (2) the 
petitioner is a nonresident of Minnesota.202 
Continuing Jurisdiction.  A Minnesota district court has continuing, 
exclusive jurisdiction over an existing child support order until all of the 
parties who are individuals have filed written consents with the court for 
a tribunal of another state to modify the order and assume continuing, 
exclusive jurisdiction.203 Minnesota may lose its continuing, exclusive 
jurisdiction with regard to prospective enforcement of an order issued in 
this state if the Minnesota child support order is modified by a tribunal of 
another state with substantially similar laws.204 
Long-arm Provisions. UIFSA also creates a domestic dispute long-
arm statute, which gives state courts personal jurisdiction over a 
nonresident that is as broad as constitutionally permitted.205  The long-
arm statute applies to both spousal and child support.  Proponents of 
UIFSA contend that use of the long-arm statute would make initiation of 
a case easier, provide greater access to information about the status of the 
 
 198. MINN. STAT. § 518C (2002). 
 199. MINN. STAT. § 518C.301 (2002). 
 200. Kasdan v. Berney, 587 N.W.2d 319, 322 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999) (citing MINN. 
STAT. § 518C.901 (1996); See also Virginia v. Richter, 475 S.E.2d 817, 819 (Va. Ct. App. 
1996) (stating UIFSA intended to establish and enforce child support orders across state 
lines) (citing John J. Sampson, UIFSA: An Interstate Support Act for the 21st Century, 27 
FAM. L.Q. 85, 86 (1993)). 
 201. MINN. STAT. § 518C.201(2) (2002). 
 202. MINN. STAT. § 518C.611(a)(1)(i)-(ii); see Rivera v. Ramsey County, 615 
N.W.2d 854, 858 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000) (stating that if neither of the parents nor the 
child resides in the state that issued an existing child-support order, a court in another 
state may modify a properly registered order). 
 203. MINN. STAT. § 518C.205(a) (2002). 
 204. See MINN. STAT. § 518C.205(c) (2002). 
 205. MINN. STAT. § 518C.201 (2002). 
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case, and give continuing, exclusive jurisdiction to only one state at any 
one time. 
Where long-arm jurisdiction cannot be obtained, UIFSA creates a 
two-state proceeding to obtain support.206  UIFSA has created special 
rules on evidence and provides assistance with discovery procedures 
where its long-arm provisions are utilized.  It also attempts to identify the 
roles for a forum state tribunal and to set up a one-order system. 
Stipulating Jurisdiction. Parties may not confer subject matter 
jurisdiction under the UIFSA on a Minnesota court by stipulation.207 
However, under Minnesota Statutes section 518C.204, Minnesota 
possesses jurisdiction over a foreign support order if the parties do not 
reside in the issuing state, the petitioner is a nonresident seeking 
modification, and the respondent is subject to personal jurisdiction in 
Minnesota.208  Therefore, to exercise jurisdiction under this statute, one 
must establish whether section 518C.204(a) or section 518C.204(b) 
applies, and then apply the appropriate statutory provision to the facts.209 
Registering an Order Under UIFSA.  Minnesota allows the 
registration of a support order from another state “for enforcement.”210 
Among the procedural prerequisites for registration is the filing of a 
 
 206. MINN. STAT. § 518C.204 (2002). 
 207. Subject matter jurisdiction is conferred by law, not by stipulation.  State ex rel. 
Farrington v. Rigg, 259 Minn. 483, 485, 107 N.W.2d 841, 842 (1961). 
 208. Minnesota law provides the following guidance concerning jurisdiction when 
there are simultaneous proceedings in another state: 
(a) A tribunal of this state may exercise jurisdiction to establish a support 
order if the petition or comparable pleading is filed after a petition or 
comparable pleading is filed in another state only if: 
(1) the petition or comparable pleading in this state is filed before the 
expiration of the time allowed in the other state for filing a responsive 
pleading challenging the exercise of jurisdiction by the other state; 
(2) the contesting party timely challenges the exercise of jurisdiction in the 
other state; and 
(3) if relevant, this state is the home state of the child. 
(b) A tribunal of this state may not exercise jurisdiction to establish a support 
order if the petition or comparable pleading is filed before a petition or 
comparable pleading is filed in another state if: 
(1) the petition or comparable pleading in the other state is filed before the 
expiration of the time allowed in this state for filing a responsive pleading 
challenging the exercise of jurisdiction by this state; 
(2) the contesting party timely challenges the exercise of jurisdiction in this 
state; and 
(3) if relevant, the other state is the home state of the child. 
MINN. STAT. § 518C.204 (2002). 
 209. Id. 
 210. MINN. STAT. § 518C.601 (2002). 
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sworn or certified statement “showing the amount of any arrearage.”211 
What Constitutes a Petition?  A request for registration of a foreign 
child support order is distinct from, and does not constitute, a “petition” 
for enforcement or modification, within the meaning of a UIFSA 
provision establishing when a Minnesota court may exercise jurisdiction 
to establish a support order after a petition or comparable pleading is 
filed in another state.212  If neither of the parents nor the child resides in 
the state that issued an existing child-support order, a court in another 
state may modify a properly registered order.213  UIFSA appears to be 
functioning quite well in Minnesota with no provisions needing 
imminent attention. 
XX. UNIFORM CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION AND ENFORCEMENT ACT 
Minnesota adopted the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and 
Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) for all custody issues raised after Jan. 1, 
2000.214  The uniform custody laws were established to resolve 
jurisdictional issues involving interstate child-custody disputes and must 
be interpreted accordingly.215 
Subject Matter Jurisdiction  to Modify Custody Decision.  A 
Minnesota court may modify another state’s custody determination if 
Minnesota is currently the child’s home state and the other state no 
longer has exclusive, continuing jurisdiction.216 
Minnesota has approached the issue of modifying a foreign court’s 
custody ruling with caution.  For example, in Schroeder v. Schroeder217 
the court held that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to modify a 
support order, and that the father did not waive his right to challenge the 
 
 211. MINN. STAT. § 518C.602(a)(3) (2002). 
 212. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518C.204 (West 2002) (citing Kasden v. Berney, 587 
N.W.2d 319 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999)). 
 213. See Rivera v. Ramsey County, 615 N.W.2d 854, 858 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000) 
(stating that a Minnesota court could modify a Puerto Rico order because Puerto Rico is 
no longer the child’s nor the parents’ state of residence, and consequently Puerto Rico no 
longer has continuing, exclusive jurisdiction); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1738B(i) (providing 
that a party seeking to modify in one state a child-support order issued in another state 
may only register the order for modification “[i]f there is no individual contestant or child 
residing in the issuing State”). 
 214. MINN. STAT. §§ 518D.101-.317 (2002). 
 215. See Nazar v. Nazar, 505 N.W.2d 628, 636 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993) (noting 
purpose of UCCJA as formerly codified under MINN. STAT. § 518A.01, subd. 1(a) 
(1992)). 
 216. MINN. STAT. § 518D.203 (2002). 
 217. 658 N.W.2d 909 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003). 
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district court’s decision finding jurisdiction to modify the order.218  At 
the time of dissolution, the father was living in California and mother 
was living in Minnesota.219  Pursuant to a stipulated order entered in 
California, the “father was granted physical custody of the parties’ minor 
child subject to the mother’s reasonable visitation and the mother was 
required to pay child support.”220  “The child resided in California until 
November 1999, when he refused to return to [his] father following a 
visit with [his] mother in Minnesota.”221 
The mother subsequently filed a motion in Minnesota to modify the 
California order.222  She asked for physical custody of the child and 
termination of her support obligation.223  The father argued that 
California had continuing exclusive subject matter jurisdiction and the 
court of appeals agreed with him.224  The court observed that: 
The UCCJEA provides that the state issuing a custody decree 
will generally retain exclusive, continuing jurisdiction over the 
decree as long as that state remains the residence of the 
children or a parent.  Minn. Stat. § 518D.202, .203(2); Cal. 
Fam. Code § 3422. It is undisputed that father is still a resident 
of California. The Minnesota court therefore lacks subject 
matter jurisdiction to modify the California custody order.225 
The court also rejected the mother’s argument that the child’s father 
had waived a challenge to Minnesota jurisdiction by failing to object to 
the registration order.226  It reasoned that the “[f]ather could not confer 
subject matter jurisdiction to the district court either by waiver or 
consent.”227 
Home State Jurisdiction.  Minnesota has jurisdiction to modify an 
out-of-state custody or visitation determination where Minnesota is 
currently the home state of the custodial parent and the child or 
 
 218. Id. at 912. 
 219. Id. at 911. 
 220. Id. 
 221. Id. 
 222. Id. 
 223. Id. 
 224. Id. (citing MINN. STAT. § 518D (2002); CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 3400-25 (West 
2002)). 
 225. Id. 
 226. Id. at 912. 
 227. Id.  See MINN. R. CIV. P. 12.08(c) “[w]henever it appears by suggestion of the 
parties or otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall 
dismiss the action.”  See also Cochrane v. Tudor Oaks Condo. Project, 529 N.W.2d 429, 
432 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995) (“[L]ack of subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any 
time, including for the first time on appeal”) (citations omitted). 
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children.228 
Emergency Jurisdiction. Minnesota may exercise temporary 
emergency jurisdiction if a child is present in this state and has been 
abandoned or it is necessary in an emergency to protect the child because 
the child, or a sibling or parent of the child, is subjected to or threatened 
with mistreatment or abuse.229  An unresolved issue involves whether 
emergency jurisdiction may be exercised by a Minnesota court upon a 
finding of abuse or mistreatment where the child is not present in the 
state.  In Beier v. Beier,230 the court held that a Minnesota court could 
not exercise emergency jurisdiction where the child was not present in 
Minnesota.231  This decision was made under the predecessor to the 
UCCJEA232 and some have suggested that the UCCJEA removed the 
dual requirement of presence in the state together with emergency 
circumstances.  This argument will most likely not prevail, however, 
because of the language of the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act 
(PKPA) directed at temporary emergency jurisdiction.233  The PKPA 
states that a custody determination can be made by a state if it has 
jurisdiction under state law and the child is physically present in such 
[s]tate and (i) the child has been abandoned, or (ii) it is necessary in an 
emergency to protect the child because he has been subjected to or 
threatened with mistreatment or abuse.234  This language is clear and it 
preempts Minnesota from exercising emergency jurisdiction. 
Exercising Jurisdiction over Visitation Issues.  Under the UCCJEA, 
Minnesota can take jurisdiction over a visitation issue only if the foreign 
visitation order has been registered in a Minnesota court in accordance 
with the UCCJEA.235 Other custody matters involving a foreign order 
should also not be considered absent proper registration under the 
 
 228. Stone v. Stone, 636 N.W.2d 594, 597 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001); see MINN. STAT. 
§§ 518D.102(h), .201(a)(1), .202 (2002) (providing Minnesota with jurisdiction to make a 
child-custody determination if Minnesota is the child’s home state, defined as the state 
where the child has lived for at least six consecutive months before commencement of 
proceedings). 
 229. MINN. STAT. § 518D.204(a) (2002); see Schmidt v. Schmidt, 436 N.W.2d 99, 
104 (Minn. 1989) (stating “emergency” jurisdiction is available only where the child has 
been subjected to or threatened by abuse). 
 230. 371 N.W.2d 52 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985). 
 231. Id. at 55-56. 
 232. MINN. STAT.. § 518A.03, subd. 1(c) (1998) (repealed Jan. 1, 2000 by 1999 
Minn. Laws ch. 74, art. 3, § 18). 
 233. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738A(c)(2)(C) (2000). 
 234. Id. 
 235. See MINN. STAT. § 518D.305(a) (2002) (establishing registration procedures). 
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UCCJEA.236 
Continuing Jurisdiction. The UCCJEA provides that the state 
issuing a custody decree will generally retain exclusive, continuing 
jurisdiction over the decree as long as that state remains the residence of 
the children or a parent.237  The foreign court does not lose its 
jurisdiction over the matter merely because a party fails to challenge the 
registration of the judgment in Minnesota.238 
Personal Jurisdiction. A majority of jurisdictions that have 
considered the question have concluded that the UCCJEA’s rational 
scheme assigning default jurisdiction to a child’s home state does not 
require that state to have personal jurisdiction over both parents of the 
child in order to make a parental rights termination decision. 
XXI. SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION—AMERICANS 
The Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 is an important jurisdictional 
statute.  The ICWA §§ 191 and 195 provide tribal courts with exclusive 
jurisdiction over proceedings concerning an Indian child who resides or 
is domiciled on an Indian reservation.239 In Mississippi Band of Choctaw 
Indians v. Holyfield, the U.S. Supreme Court held that custody and 
adoption decisions involving Indian children born off an Indian 
reservation to parents who were domiciled on the reservation at the time 
of birth gave the tribe to which the parents belonged exclusive 
jurisdiction to decide those issues.240  Domicile was defined as physical 
presence with the intent to remain on the reservation.241  Minors will take 
the domicile of their parents because they are legally incapable of 
forming the requisite state-of-mind (intent) to create a domicile.242  The 
Court made it clear that parents could not defeat the intent of the ICWA 
absent changing their domicile.243 
Minnesota courts do not have jurisdiction over matters on Indian 
 
 236. See supra note 227 and accompanying text. 
 237. MINN. STAT. § 518D.202, .203(2) (2002). 
 238. Schroeder v. Schroeder, 658 N.W.2d 909, 912 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003); see 
MINN. STAT. § 518D.305(c)(3) (2002) (reading in part: “failure to contest the registration 
[within 20 days] will result in confirmation of the child custody determination and 
preclude further contest of that determination with respect to any matter that could have 
been asserted”). 
 239. Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 52-53 (1989). 
 240. Id. 
 241. Id. at 48 (citing Texas v. Florida, 306 U.S. 398, 424 (1939)). 
 242. Id. (citing Yarborough v. Yarborough, 290 U.S. 202, 211 (1933)). 
 243. Id. at 52-53. 
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reservations unless Congress has specifically granted such jurisdiction to 
the state.244  Public Law 280 eliminated most federal restrictions on state 
court jurisdiction in paternity and child support cases involving one or 
more Indians where state court jurisdiction does not interfere with Indian 
self-governance.245 The Federal Act authorizes state court assumption of 
jurisdiction over civil causes of action where Indians are parties. 
When Congress passed Public Law 280, it granted Minnesota 
general jurisdiction over criminal and civil actions on Indian 
reservations.246  However, the Red Lake Indian Reservation was 
explicitly excluded from this grant of general jurisdiction.247 
Despite the Red Lake Band’s unique status, Minnesota has subject 
matter jurisdiction over persons normally under the jurisdiction of the 
Band when they are off the reservation but within the state.248  However, 
in the absence of a compelling state interest, the state will not exercise its 
jurisdictional authority over members of the Red Lake Band found off-
reservation when such action will undermine the Band’s efforts to 
achieve effective self-government.249 
To illustrate this point, consider Desjarlait v. Desjarlait250 where 
Minnesota asserted subject matter jurisdiction over a custody suit 
involving Indian parents.251  The court gave three reasons for its 
decision: (1) the tribal court relinquished jurisdiction over custody; (2) 
the Indian father, who later claimed lack of state court jurisdiction, 
initially commenced the dissolution matter in state court rather than tribal 
court; and (3) the Indian mother and children resided off the 
reservation.252 
 
 244. In re K.K.S., 508 N.W.2d 813, 815 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993) (citing Red Lake 
Band of Chippewa Indians v. State, 311 Minn. 241, 247, 48 N.W.2d 722, 726 (1976); 
Sigana v. Bailey, 282 Minn. 367, 369, 164 N.W.2d 886, 888 (1960); see Recent Case, 
Red Lake Band of Chippewa Indians v. State, 248 N.W.2d 722 (1976), 4 WM. MITCHELL 
L. REV. 454, 455-56 (1978)). 
 245. Becker County Welfare Dep’t v. Bellcourt, 453 N.W.2d 543, 544 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 1990) (citing Act of Aug. 15, 1953, ch. 505, 67 Stat. 589 (codified as amended at 28 
U.S.C.A. § 1360 (West 1976 & Supp. 1989))). 
 246. In re K.K.S., 508 N.W.2d at 815 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (1988) (granting 
criminal jurisdiction); 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1988) (granting civil jurisdiction)). 
 247. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1162(a) (1953); 28 U.S.C. § 1360(a) (1953)). 
 248. Id. (citing Red Lake Band, 311 Minn. at 247, 248 N.W.2d at 726). 
 249. Id. (citing State v. Red Lake DFL Comm., 303 N.W.2d 54, 55 (Minn. 1981) 
(quoting Red Lake Band, 311 Minn. at 248, 248 N.W.2d at 727)). 
 250. 379 N.W.2d 139 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985). 
 251. Id. at 142-43. 
 252. Id. 
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In contrast, in In re K.K.S.,253 the court ruled it did not have subject 
matter jurisdiction to decide custody of minor children and supported its 
decision with three reasons: (1) the Red Lake Nation tribal court has 
exercised jurisdiction over the custody matter of the child, (2) the Indian 
mother had never submitted to the authority of a Minnesota court, and 
(3) the non-Indian father had subjected himself to the authority of the 
tribal court when he chose to live on the reservation with the child and its 
mother.254 
Minnesota’s interest in a custody dispute is not always 
overshadowed by tribal sovereignty—especially where the dispute 
occurs off the Indian reservation.  Physical presence off the reservation 
and a compelling state interest in a child’s welfare may justify Minnesota 
exercising initial jurisdiction in a custody dispute between an Indian and 
non-Indian.255  Neither federal law nor public policy preempts state 
power over interparental child custody disputes where the Indian child 
and at least one parent reside off the reservation.256 
Where a tribal court and a state court share authority over a custody 
dispute such as in K.K.S., the state court’s decision to decline jurisdiction 
in favor of the tribal court is proper for several reasons.  First, doing 
otherwise may encourage parental kidnapping.257  Second, dismissing 
the state court action eliminates the possibility of conflicting decrees that 
would undermine the authority of both the tribal and state courts and 
disrupt the lives of the mother, father and child.258  Third, declining 
jurisdiction in favor of the tribal court recognizes the cultural identity of 
a child like K.K.S. and promotes tribal integrity by acknowledging that 
 
 253. 508 N.W.2d 813 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993). 
 254 Id. at 816. 
 255. Id. (citing Red Lake Band, 311 Minn. at 247, 248 N.W.2d at 726). 
 256. Id. (citing 25 U.S.C. § 1903(1) (1988) (Indian Child Welfare Act by its terms 
does not apply to interparental custody disputes); Barbara A. Atwood, Fighting Over 
Indian Children: The Uses and Abuses of Jurisdictional Ambiguity, 36 UCLA L. REV. 
1051, 1075 (1989) (stating Public Law 280 does not adequately resolve jurisdictional 
disputes in certain cases)). 
 257. Id. (citing Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-611, § 
7(c), 94 stat. 3566, 3569 (1980) (one purpose of the Act is to deter abductions by basing 
jurisdiction on a child’s connections with a state rather than mere presence in it); MINN. 
STAT. § 518A.01 (1992) (one purpose of Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act is to 
deter abductions)). 
 258. Id. (citing Fisher v. District Ct., 424 U.S. 382, 388 (1976) (“[State court 
jurisdiction] would create a substantial risk of conflicting adjudications affecting the 
custody of the child and would cause a corresponding decline in the authority of the 
Tribal Court.”)). 
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children are vital to the continued existence of a tribe.259  Fourth, a 
decision favoring the tribal court is consistent with the federal policy of 
encouraging tribal autonomy.260  Finally, such a ruling satisfies the 
parens patriae role of both the state and the tribe in protecting the 
welfare of the child.261 
XXII. PARENTAL KIDNAPPING PREVENTION ACT 
One of the thorniest problems faced by state courts involves 
interstate custody disputes.  Although a majority of states have adopted 
some form of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement 
Act (UCCJEA), the preemptive nature of federal law should not be 
ignored.  To the extent that a state custody statute conflicts with federal 
law, the latter will always prevail. 
Because the states were unable to agree on a uniform application of 
principles among them, non-custodial parents sometimes exploited the 
situation by forcibly taking children from the state issuing the custody 
decree to another state with less-stringent jurisdictional requirements.  To 
discourage that activity and to allocate powers and duties among courts 
of different states, in 1980 Congress enacted the Parental Kidnapping 
Prevention Act (PKPA).262  The Act applies to criminal civil proceedings 
including disputes involving interstate custody.263  Essentially, PKPA 
favors continuing jurisdiction in the original state, provided that such 
state initially acted in compliance with PKPA.  If it did so, a second state 
may not exercise jurisdiction and must give full faith and credit to the 
custody order of the first state.  The second state must enforce the order 
 
 259. Id. at 816-17 (citing 25 U.S.C. § 1901(3) (1988) (finding “there is no resource 
that is more vital to the continued existence and integrity of Indian tribes than their 
children”); 25 U.S.C. § 1901(5) (1988) (finding state exercise of jurisdiction over Indian 
child custody proceedings often fails “to recognize the essential tribal relations of Indian 
people and the cultural and social standards prevailing in Indian communities and 
families”)). 
 260. Id. at 817 (citing 25 U.S.C. § 1902 (1988)). 
 261. Id. (citing MINN. STAT § 518A.03, subd. 1 (1992) (repealed Jan. 1, 2000 by 
1999 Minn. Laws c. 74, art. 3 § 18) (recognizing Minnesota’s interest in protecting the 
interests of the child); RED LAKE TRIBAL CODE § 801.13 (date unknown) (recognizing 
tribe’s interest)). 
 262. In re Interest of K.G., 876 P.2d 1, 6 (Colo. Ct. App. 1993) rev’d 890 P.2d 647 
(Colo. 1995) (citing Russell M. Coombs, Progress Under the PKPA, 6 J. AM. ACAD. 
MATRIMONIAL LAW. 59 (1990)). 
 263. See Anne B. Goldstein, Tragedy of the Interstate Child: A Critical 
Reexamination of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act and the Parental 
Kidnapping Prevention Act, 25 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 845, 849-50 (1992). 
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and may not modify it unless the original state has lost or declines 
jurisdiction. 
The United States Supreme Court has made it clear that under the 
provisions of the PKPA, once a state properly exercises jurisdiction, 
other states must give full faith and credit to the determination and no 
other state may exercise concurrent jurisdiction even if it would be 
entitled to do so under its own laws.  The Court has stated that Congress’ 
chief aim in enacting the PKPA was to extend the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause to custody determinations.264  The effect of § 1738A(d) and § 
1738A(f) of the PKPA is to limit custody jurisdiction to the first state to 
properly enter a custody order, as long as certain requirements are met.  
The Act defines a federal standard for continuing exclusive custody 
jurisdiction.  The first state must have possessed initial custody 
jurisdiction when it entered its first order (according to criteria in the 
Act) and it must remain “the residence of the child or any contestant” 
when it later modifies that order. 
PKPA incorporates a state law inquiry. In order to retain exclusive 
responsibility for modifying a prior custody order, the first state must 
still have custody jurisdiction as a matter of its own custody law.  
However, if the federal and state criteria for continuing jurisdiction are 
met, the first state can, if it decides to do so, relinquish jurisdiction in 
favor of a court better situated to assess the child’s needs. 
To retain jurisdiction under the PKPA, a state must have initially 
obtained and must continue to exercise jurisdiction in accordance with its 
own laws.  In addition, a state must also meet one of the five enumerated 
jurisdictional conditions of the PKPA.265  Once the original state has 
made a custody determination, another state may modify the 
determination only if it has jurisdiction and “the court of the other State 
no longer has jurisdiction, or it has declined to exercise such jurisdiction 
to modify such determination.”266 
Persons who “snatch” children may be criminally prosecuted under 
 
 264. Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 183 (1988). 
 265. The first four (home state, if no home state then significant connection and 
substantial evidence, abandonment or neglect, no other state claims jurisdiction and 
asserting jurisdiction is in the child’s best interests) are essentially the same as the four 
jurisdictional provisions of the UCCJEA.  The fifth condition is that a court making a 
determination through exercise of one of the first four conditions retains a legally 
sufficient tie to the case as long as that court keeps jurisdiction under its own laws and 
remains the residence of the child or of any contestant. 
 266. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(f)(2) (2000). 
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PKPA.267  A federal warrant for unlawful flight is available to the 
custodial parent for illegal child snatching and permits the intervention of 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation in such instances. 
XXIII. SOLDIERS’ AND SAILORS’ RELIEF ACT 
The Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil Relief Act of 1940 tolls the period 
in which a party must assert the nonexistence of the parent and child 
relationship during the time the member of the military was on active 
duty.  The Act provides: 
The period of military service shall not be included in 
computing any period . . . for the bringing of any action or 
proceeding in any court . . . whether such cause of action or the 
right or privilege to institute such action or proceeding shall 
have accrued prior to or during the periods of such service.268 
A presumed father who is in the military service is entitled to 
protection from the Act.269  In Jackson v. Jackson,270 the Minnesota 
Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in holding that a military serviceman was not entitled to stay 
child support proceedings while overseas because his presence was 
unnecessary and evidence could fairly and more expeditiously be 
presented by affidavits and documentary evidence.271  However, before 
moving forward at a family law hearing without the presence of a 
member of the military, the court must make a specific finding that the 
absence of the service person does not materially affect his or her ability 
to conduct a defense under the Act.272 
Jackson v. Jackson was decided before Conroy v. Aniskoff,273 which 
casts doubt upon it. In Conroy v. Aniskoff, the United States Supreme 
Court held that a member of the armed services is not required to show 
that his military service prejudiced his ability to bring an action in order 
for section 525 of the Act to toll the limitations period.274  The Court 
construed the provision to protect “all military personnel on active 
duty.”275  The critical factor in these cases is military service, and once 
 
 267. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (2000). 
 268. 50 U.S.C. app. § 525 (1988). 
 269. See id. 
 270. 403 N.W.2d 248 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987). 
 271. Id. at 251. 
 272. See id at 250-51. 
 273. 507 U.S. 511 (1993). 
 274. Id. at 512-13, 518. 
 275. Id. at 515. 
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shown, the period of limitations may be tolled for the duration of the 
military service.276 
XXIV. FAMILY DISPUTES IN FEDERAL COURT— 
SUBJECT MATTER LIMITS 
It is a well-accepted principle that federal courts are courts of 
limited subject matter jurisdiction.277  In addition to the general limits 
applied to federal courts in civil actions, there are additional limitations 
when domestic matters are concerned.  The added limitations arise from 
the “domestic relations exception” that was birthed in the nineteenth 
century.  It first appeared in an 1858 decision, Barber v. Barber,278 
where the United States Supreme Court declared that federal courts are 
without power to hear disputes based upon diversity jurisdiction 
involving “the subject of divorce, or for the allowance of alimony.”279  
The Court did not clearly explain the basis for the exception, but since its 
decision in Barber the exception has been refined. 
The exception is based on the history underlying the congressional 
grant of power to the federal courts and on the policy consideration that 
states have traditionally adjudicated marital and child custody disputes 
due to competence and expertise in adjudicating such matters.280  It is 
also thought that state courts are peculiarly suited to enforce state 
regulations and domestic relations decrees involving alimony and child 
custody, particularly because such decrees often demand substantial 
continuing judicial oversight.281  State courts also have close connections 
to local agencies, which resolve conflicts resulting from domestic 
decrees.  Because the state courts are accustomed to handling these 
cases, they are probably better handled in that venue. 
The domestic relations exception was delineated in Ankenbrandt v. 
Richards, where the Court stated that federal courts are divested of the 
power to issue divorce decree awards, alimony, and child custody 
orders.282  Because the limitation is one of subject matter jurisdiction, it 
 
 276. Bickford v. United States, 656 F.2d 636, 639 (Ct. Cl. 1981) (citing Ricard v. 
Birch, 529 F.2d 214, 217 (4th Cir. 1975). 
 277. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2000) (regarding federal question), 28 U.S.C. § 
1332(a)(1) (2000) (regarding diversity actions between citizens of different states 
involving matters in controversy exceeding $75,000, exclusive of costs and interest). 
 278. 62 U.S. 582 (1858). 
 279. Id. at 584. 
 280. See Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 695-701 (1992). 
 281. See Firestone v. Cleveland Trust Co., 654 F.2d 1212, 1215-16 (6th Cir. 1981). 
 282. Ankenbrandt, 504 U.S. at 703. 
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is not waivable. 
The Court in Ankenbrandt narrowly limited the exception.  Lawsuits 
affecting domestic relations, however substantial, are not within the 
exception unless the claim at issue is one to obtain a divorce or establish 
alimony or child custody.  This narrow construction led the Court to hold 
that the exception did not apply to tort claims despite their intimate 
connection to family affairs.283 
While some lower federal courts had permitted declarative actions 
involving the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act284 to be heard, 
especially where there were conflicting decisions by state courts on the 
custody of a minor child, the United States Supreme Court ended such 
actions.  In an opinion without dissent, it held that federal courts may not 
play an enforcement role when two states disagree over which parent 
should have custody of a child.285 
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has heard a few domestic 
disputes.  It has stated that, in general, “disputes over the custody of 
children are not subject to federal jurisdiction.”286  It has also rejected 
civil rights claims brought against lawyers, judges, litigants, and others 
where the allegation is that they are responsible for the plaintiff’s loss of 
custody of the minor children involved in a divorce.287  In a family 
decision affecting child support in Minnesota, it rejected a constitutional 
attack on the Federal Child Support Recovery Act (CSRA), and joined 
several other circuits that have also rejected such an attack.288 
XXV. ABSTENTION DOCTRINE IN FEDERAL COURT 
Where timely and adequate state-court review is available in a 
federal court, and despite the fact it has subject matter jurisdiction, it may 
abstain from hearing the case.  The United States Supreme Court has 
 
 283. See id. at 704. 
 284. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (2000). 
 285. Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 187 (1988). 
 286. Robinson v. Eng, 989 F.2d 505 (table), 1993 WL 51808 at *1 (8th Cir. (Neb.) 
Jan. 11, 1993) (citing Ankenbrandt, 504 U.S. 689).  “Parents do not have an absolute 
unabridgeable constitutional right to the custody of their children.”  Id.  (citing Ruffalo v. 
Civiletti, 702 F.2d 710 (8th Cir. 1983)). 
 287. Id. 
 288. See United States v. Crawford, 115 F.3d 1397, 1400 (8th Cir. 1997) (citing 
United States v. Johnson, 114 F.3d 476, 479-81 (4th Cir. 1997); United States v. Parker, 
108 F.3d 28, 29-31 (3d Cir. 1997); United States v. Bongiorno, 106 F.3d 1027, 1030-33 
(1st Cir. 1997); United States v. Hampshire, 95 F.3d 999, 1001-04 (10th Cir. 1996); 
United States v. Mussari, 95 F.3d 787, 790-91 (9th Cir. 1996); United States v. Sage, 92 
F.3d 101, 104-07 (2d Cir. 1996)). 
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suggested that abstention “might be relevant in a case involving elements 
of the domestic relationship even when the parties do not seek divorce, 
alimony, or child custody.”289  This would be so when a case presents 
“‘difficult questions of state law bearing on policy problems of 
substantial public import whose importance transcends the result in the 
case then at bar.’ ”290  In Younger v. Harris,291 the Supreme Court 
required that a federal court abstain from enjoining a pending state 
criminal proceeding.  In Middlesex County Ethics Committee v. Garden 
State Bar Ass’n.,292 the Court applied Younger to non-criminal judicial 
proceedings where important state interests are involved.  Later, the 
Court extended the Younger principles to state civil proceedings.  In 
Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc.,293 the Court held that federal courts must 
abstain from hearing challenges to pending state proceedings where the 
state’s interest is so important that exercising federal jurisdiction would 
disrupt the comity between federal and state courts.294  Younger requires 
federal courts to abstain where: (1) state proceedings are pending, (2) the 
state proceedings involve an important state interest, and (3) the state 
proceedings will afford the plaintiff an adequate opportunity to raise his 
constitutional claims.295 
XXVI. PARTITION ACTIONS 
Occasionally, a Minnesota court is asked to award an interest in 
land located within its borders but it lacks personal jurisdiction over one 
party.296  Typically, this problem triggers a partition action.297  The 
Minnesota Supreme Court held in Searles v. Searles298 that Minnesota 
had jurisdiction to hear an action to partition land located within the state 
even though the parties to the dispute were married and divorced in 
Missouri and neither was a resident or domiciled here.299 
 
 289. Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 690 (1992) 
 290. Id. at 705-06 (quoting Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United 
States, 424 U.S. 800, 814 (1976)). 
 291. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 41 (1971). 
 292. 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982). 
 293. Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1 (1987). 
 294. Id. at 10. 
 295. See Younger, 401 U.S. at 43-52. 
 296. See, e.g., Larsen v. Erickson, 222 Minn. 363, 363, 24 N.W.2d 711, 712 (1946) 
(stating “in divorce action, the parties’ marriage status, and not their cohabitation, 
furnishes the subject matter of the court’s jurisdiction.”). 
 297. Partition actions are brought pursuant to MINN. STAT. § 558.01 (1986). 
 298. 420 N.W.2d 581 (Minn. 1988), aff’g 412 N.W.2d 11 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987). 
 299. Id. at 584. 
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The disputed Minnesota property had been acquired during the 
parties’ marriage, which was dissolved by a Missouri court in 1971.  
However, their divorce decree failed to deal with distribution of any real 
estate.  Years later the ex-wife discovered the existence of the land in 
Minnesota and initiated a partition action.  While holding that Minnesota 
had in rem jurisdiction to hear the partition action, the court raised but 
left unanswered the question of whether Minnesota should dismiss the 
action on the ground of forum non conveniens.  The court observed that 
dissolution of the marriage under the Missouri decree did not extinguish 
the ex-wife’s claim to a marital interest in the Minnesota real estate.  The 
court found support for this view in Grodzicki v. Quast,300 where a 
Florida divorce decree had failed to dispose of the parties’ property and 
the court held that Minnesota could dispose of it. 
The court underscored the importance of closely examining the 
legal theory upon which a party seeking a partition based upon a foreign 
divorce decree is proceeding.  For example, if the party asserts that 
recovery is warranted because certain marital property was omitted from 
a dissolution decree, it is doubtful that Minnesota has jurisdiction to hear 
the action because nothing in the marriage relationship involved 
Minnesota, i.e., the couple were married, resided for their married life, 
and divorced outside the state.  However, if the party seeking a partition 
pursues the action on the basis that Minnesota has in rem jurisdiction 
over Minnesota land for partition purposes and sculpts the lawsuit as 
seeking an interest in land, then courts will probably hear it.  The 
rationale is that in rem jurisdiction includes the right to determine title 
and ownership to the land as a condition precedent to dividing or 
ordering its sale.301 
XXVII. ENFORCING OUT-OF-STATE JUDGMENTS 
Minnesota has jurisdiction to handle domestic disputes based on 
out-of-state judgments if both parties reside in Minnesota.  Furthermore, 
it may, in certain situations, apply its own domestic law to resolve a 
dispute rather than the law of the state where the judgment was originally 
entered. 
For example, both parties in Hodges v. Hodges302 had moved to 
 
 300. 276 Minn. 34, 149 N.W.2d 8 (1967). 
 301. The court noted that although the trial court had jurisdiction, it possessed the 
discretion to refuse to hear the matter on the basis that Minnesota was an inconvenient 
forum.  See id. at 39, 149 N.W.2d at 12. 
 302. 415 N.W.2d 62 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987). 
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Minnesota following their 1971 Indiana divorce.  The ex-wife brought a 
motion asking Minnesota to modify the Indiana maintenance award.  
Minnesota law allowed the motion, while Indiana did not.  Therefore, if 
Minnesota refused to hear the ex-wife’s motion, she was foreclosed from 
obtaining a change in support.  The Minnesota Court of Appeals held 
that Minnesota had jurisdiction to modify the judgment.303  It justified its 
decision in part on the lengthy period the couple had lived outside 
Indiana and in Minnesota. 
The standard for giving full faith and credit to a foreign judgment is 
found in Roche v. McDonald.304 
It is settled that the full faith and credit clause of the 
Constitution requires that the judgment of a State court, which 
had jurisdiction of the parties and the subject matter in suit, 
shall be given effect in every other State.305  Furthermore, 
decisions shall be equally conclusive upon the merits.  Only 
such defenses as would be good to a suit thereon in that State 
can be relied on in the courts of any other State.306  Final 
judgments should be accorded full faith and credit by the 
various states.307 
The Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution 
requires recognition and enforcement of alimony payments accrued 
under an inalterable judgment for a specific amount of money rendered 
in another jurisdiction.308  The judgment and decree are final for the 
purposes of full faith and credit, subject to the usual grounds for vacation 
of a money judgment.309  Problems occur, however, if the foreign 
 
 303. Id. at 66 (citing Rudolf v. Rudolf, 48 N.W.2d 740 (Minn. 1984)).  The court 
justified its decision in part on the lengthy period the couple had lived outside Indiana 
and in Minnesota.  Id. at 67. 
 304. 275 U.S. 449 (1928). 
 305. Id. at 451-52 (citation omitted). 
 306. Id. (citation omitted). 
 307. See Sistare v. Sistare, 218 U.S. 1 at 25-26.  See Griffin v. Griffin, 327 U.S. 220, 
234 (1946); Donald P. Barrett, Note, Constitutional Law: Due Process: Requirement of 
Notice Before Enforcing Judgment for Arrears of Alimony Payable in Installments, 34 
CAL. L. REV. 760, 762-63 (1946); Recent Case, Constitutional Law—Due Process—
Conflict of Laws—Recognition of Foreign Ex Parte Judgment for Arrears of Alimony, 31 
MINN. L. REV. 95, 95-96 (1946-47); see also Haas v. Haas, 282 Minn. 420, 422-23, 165 
N.W.2d 240, 242-43 (1969) (citing Anderson v. Lyons, 226 Minn. 330, 32 N.W.2d 849 
(1948); Holton v. Holton, 153 Minn. 346, 190 N.W. 542 (1922)), overruled on other 
grounds by Matson v. Matson, 310 N.W.2d 502 (Minn. 1981). 
 308. See Rudolf v. Rudolf, 348 N.W.2d 740, 742 (Minn. 1984); see also Uniform 
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act, MINN. STAT. § 548.26-.33 (2000). 
 309. Matson v. Matson, 310 N.W.2d 502, 505 (Minn. 1981) (citing Haas v. Haas, 
282 Minn. 420, 165 N.W.2d 240; Holton v. Holton, 153 Minn. 346, 190 N.W. 542 
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alimony decree is not final or if it may be modified either as to future or 
past installments.310 
The Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act (UEFJA)311 
provides a speedy and economical method of enforcing a foreign 
judgment.312  It relieves creditors and debtors alike from the costs and 
harassment of additional litigation.313  The procedure is optional and 
does not impair the existing remedies available to a judgment creditor.314 
Judgments that meet the definition in Minnesota Statutes section 
548.26 may be filed under the Uniform Act.315  A foreign judgment filed 
under the Uniform Act is essentially converted to a Minnesota judgment 
when the provisions of the statute are followed.316 
XXVIII. CONCLUSION 
This article has surveyed, analyzed, and commented on subject 
matter and personal jurisdiction issues in the family law area from the 
perspective of the Minnesota legal system.  In general, the Minnesota 
 
(1992)). 
 310. Shulman v. Miller, 191 F. Supp. 418, 421 (D. Wis. 1961); RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 109 (1971); see Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 
287, 290 (1945); Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 544-45 (1948); Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 
354 U.S. 416, 517-18 (1957); Krauspkopf, Divisible Divorce and Rights to Support, 
Property and Custody, 24 OHIO ST. L.J. 346 (1963); Recent Case, Conflict of Laws—
Divorce—Enforcement of Prior Separation Maintenance Decree, 33 MINN. L. REV. 307 
(1949). 
 311. MINN. STAT. § 548.26-33 (2000). 
 312. Ehrenzweig v. Ehrenzweig, 383 N.Y.S.2d 487, 492 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976), aff’d, 
402 N.Y.S.2d 638 (N.Y. App. Div. 1978).  See Light v. Light, 147 N.E.2d 34, 37 (Ill. 
1958); Comment, According Full Faith and Credit to Foreign Modifiable Alimony 
Decrees, 26 U. CHI. L. REV. 136, 150 (1958-59). 
 313. UNIF. ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS ACT § 13 U.L.A. 173-74 (1980). 
 314. MINN. STAT. § 548.31 (2002)  “ ‘Foreign judgment’ means any judgment, 
decree, or order of a court of the United States or of any other court which is entitled to 
full faith and credit in this state.”  MINN. STAT. § 548.26 (2002). 
 315. MINN. STAT. § 548.28 (2002). 
 316. See MINN. STAT. § 548.27 (2002).   
A certified copy of any foreign judgment may be filed in the office of the court 
administrator of any district court of this state.  The court administrator shall 
treat the foreign judgment in the same manner as a judgment of any district 
court or the supreme court of this state, and upon the filing of a certified copy 
of a foreign judgment in the office of the court administrator of district court of 
a county, it may not be filed in another district court in the state.  A judgment 
so filed has the same effect and is subject to the same procedures, defenses and 
proceedings for reopening, vacating, or staying as a judgment of a district court 
or the supreme court of this state, and may be enforced or satisfied in like 
manner.  Id. 
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legal system has done a good job.  When jurisdiction is at issue, 
Minnesota tends to remain within the mainstream of American 
jurisprudence, although there are areas needing greater focus and 
possible clarification. 
For example, the literal interpretation given to Minnesota Statues 
section 518.07 is troubling.  Either the language in the statute should be 
modified to reflect a modern-day understanding of such a provision or 
the courts should revisit it with an eye toward revaluing their century-old 
view of the application.  There is little sense in allowing a judgment to be 
reopened years after it was entered, and long after the parties have 
litigated all of the issues in the dispute, because the court lacked what 
today is characterized as subject matter jurisdiction.  New York’s view of 
a similar provision should be adopted. 
It would also be useful to have two clear definitions in Chapter 518: 
one for residence and a second for domicile.  It would also be useful to 
replace the existing general long-arm statute with language to the effect 
that “Minnesota will exercise personal jurisdiction in all cases that do not 
offend the Constitution of the United States.”  There is little need for any 
additional language in the long-arm statute. 
There should also be a reexamination of the emerging role that 
“status” may play in the personal jurisdiction area.  With personal liberty 
at stake, the examination should be very cautious. 
Overall, there should be continued work on obtaining uniform 
outcomes when faced with due process issues within the family context.  
It is suggested that consistency in outcomes will be increased by 
focusing only on the harm to the Minnesota child, and not on the conduct 
of the parents, or where the child was born, or the nature of the claim 
being made.  A more straightforward rule of law will make it easier for 
the bench and bar to reach uniform understanding in this area. 
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